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ABSTRACT

This

Article

critically

examines

arguments

tracing

contemporarycrises in the Arab world to the making of the Arab
state system a century ago. A series of popular and scholarly
articles occasioned by the recent spate of World War I-related
centenariessuggest that new boundariesbe drawn in the Middle
East to produce more stable nation-states. More specifically, a set
of authors has advocated for different borders that would avoid
ethno-sectarian conflict by designing relatively homogenous
smaller states to replace multiethnic, multisectarian states like
Iraq and Syria. Such proposals are significant for the underlying
presumptions they reflect concerning the relationship between
stability and diversity in the Middle East. This Article first offers
a historicalcorrective to the purportedartificialityof the current
boundaries defining the states in the region. Second, the Article
calls into question the legal and political grounds for arguing
that more homogenous states would be more stable or better
reflect the preferences of the underlyingpopulation. The Article
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concludes by suggesting alternative reforms that might serve the

goals of conflict resolution in the Middle East.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The last five years have been marked by a flurry of centenaries
connected to the First World War. Like much of the postcolonial world,
the modern Middle East state system is in part an artifact of the
postwar settlement and the sequence of events this set in motion. By
the end of the war, the Ottoman Empire had collapsed bringing down
with it the long-standing order that had defined much of the Middle
East.' What followed was a period of intense negotiations among the
victorious imperial powers to carve up the region into a variety of
2
quasi-colonial protectorates and spheres of influence. Agreements to
divide the region were concluded, reversed, renegotiated, and

resurrected for years beginning in the midst of the war and continuing
3
on and off for at least half a decade thereafter.

1.

See generally EUGENE ROGAN, THE FALL OF THE

OTTOMANS:

THE GREAT WAR

IN THE MIDDLE EAST (2015) (ebook) (discussing the catalysts of the end of the Ottoman
empire and the various stages of change in the Middle East).
See DAVID FROMKIN, A PEACE TO END ALL PEACE: THE FALL OF THE OTTOMAN
2.
EMPIRE AND THE CREATION OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST 389-416 (1989) (describing

the negotiations following the fall of the Ottoman empire)
See id.
3.

2020]

REMAPPING OF THE MIDDLE EAST

407

Because the centenaries of these events have coincided with a
period of violence and instability in much of the Middle East, 4 they
have occasioned a deluge of commentary tying current crises to origin
stories that date back one hundred years.5 It is in this context that a
century after they met to conclude a secret agreement dividing
Ottoman territories into British and French zones of influence, Mark
Sykes and Frangois Georges-Picot were back in the news.6 Images of
an ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) bulldozer rolling over a

small section of the frontier between Syria and Iraq in order to destroy
the "Sykes-Picot" border shone a spotlight on the centenary of their
agreement.7
Following ISIS' cue, popular commentary in the West has largely
taken as given that the Sykes-Picot Agreement imposed a Europeandesigned system of borders on Arab lands. 8 Many of the English-

language commentators invoking Sykes-Picot, from David Ignatius9 to
Noam Chomsky,1 0 shared with ISIS the view that this colonial
imposition bore a portion of responsibility for the contemporary ills of
the region. Likewise, political leaders in the region from President

4.
See Borzou Daraghi, As the New Year Dawns, More Wars are Brewing in the
Middle East, INDEP. (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.independent.co.uk/preview-of-the-year9
201 /middle-east-wars-conflict-saudi-arabia-khashoggi-israel-iran-syria-trump-us-iraqa8679831.html [https://perma.cc/MJH8-JLC6] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (discussing
violence and instability throughout the Middle East stemming from power struggles).
5.
See James Reinl, Sykes-Picot Agreement Unravelling on its Centenary,
MIDDLE E. EYE (May 12, 2016), https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sykes-picotagreement-unravelling-its-centenary [https://perma.cc/R28G-SNXT] (archived Nov. 10,
2019) (explaining unrest in the Middle East in terms of the unraveling of the Skyes-Picot
Agreement).

6.
See, e.g., A Century on: Why Arabs Resent Sykes-Picot, AL JAZEERA (May 2016)
https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2016/sykes-picot-100-years-middle-eastmap/index.html [https://perma.cc/7LLE-6NW3] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (discussing
criticisms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement) [hereinafter Why Arabs Resent Sykes-Picot].
7.
See Malise Ruthven, The Map ISIS Hates, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (June 25, 2014),
http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2014/06/25/map-isis-hates/
[https://perma.cc/2EY4PRTP] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (reproducing the images distributed by ISIS).
8.
See, e.g., Jim Muir, Sykes-Picot: The Map that Spawned a Century of
Resentment, BRIT. BROAD. CORP. (May 16, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddle-east-36300224
[https://perma.cc/W5M3-AAMX]
(archived Nov. 10, 2019)
(describing the conflict surrounding the Sykes-Picot map).
9.
See David Ignatius, Opinion, Piecing Together the Shattering Middle East,
WASH. POST (June 17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatiuspiecing-together-the-shattering-middle-east/2014/06/17/e73812f8-f63a-11e3-a606946fd632f9f1_story.html [https://perma.cc/V4SD-7Z7S] (archived Nov. 10, 2019)
(arguing the dividing line from the Sykes-Picot agreement contributes to instability in
the Middle East).
10.
Interview by Maha Zaraket with Noam Chomsky, Author & Professor, in
Beirut (June 17, 2013), https://zcoim.org/znetarticle/noam-chomsky-interview-sykespicot-is-failing-by-noam-chomsky/ [https://perma.cc/FKX6-2TYV] (archived Nov. 10,
2019) (discussing how the Sykes-Picot Agreement is falling apart).
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Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey" to Lebanon's Druze leader, Walid
Jumblatt,1 2 invoked Sykes-Picot as part of their explanation for
current instability. Some historians of the region offered incisive

critiques of these claims,

but their views reached

far smaller

audiences.1 3 Instead, the voices of Middle East policy analysts in the
4
United States and the United Kingdom, like Itamar Rabinovitch' and
5
Patrick Cockburn,1 lent their authority to the growing chorus that
attributed the sectarian wars engulfing Iraq and Syria to the

boundaries set by Sykes-Picot. Even as the ISIS threat has receded
somewhat and the Sykes-Picot centenary has passed, new arguments
In a particularly colorful example of such invocations, during a speech at
11.
Marmara University Erdogan accused "modern Lawrences" of concluding new "SykesPicot agreements" while "hiding behind freedom of press, a war of independence or jihad"
to justify their activities. He appeared to be referring to journalists covering Turkey's
blockage of Kobani in the fall of 2014, but also to foreign supporters of his nemesis
Fethullah Gulen as well as supporters of the PKK. He went on to argue that "each
conflict in this region has been designed a century ago when the borders of the Middle
East were redrawn after World War I." Agence France-Presse, President Erdogan Slams
Modern 'Lawrences of Arabia' in Middle East, HURRIYET DAILY NEWS (Oct. 13, 2014),
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/president-erdogan-slams -modern-lawrences-ofarabia-in-middle-east-72903 [https://perma.cc/GHS3-YM5E] (archived Dec. 30, 2019)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Marc Champion, Erdogan of 2 Arabia,
4
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 14, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/ 01 -1014/erdogan-of-arabia [https://perma.cc/3JUL-4T4D] (archived Dec. 30, 2019).
See Robert Fisk, The Old Partitionof the Middle East is Dead. I Dread to
12.
2014),
13,
(June
INDEP.
Follow,
Will
What
Think
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/robert-fisk-the-old-partition-ofthe-middle-east-is-dead-i-dread-to-think-what-will-follow-9536467.html
[https://perma.c/Q3LR-MGMU] (archived Nov. 10, 2019).
See, e.g., Daniel Neep, Focus: The Middle East, Hallucination, and the
13.
2015),
3,
(Jan.
Soc'Y
DISCOvER
Imagination,
Cartographic
https://discoversociety.org/2015/01/03/focus-the-middle-east-hallucination-and-thecartographic-imagination/ [https://perma.cc/S2ZV-3YF5] (archived Nov. 10, 2019); Sara
Pursley, 'Lines Drawn on an Empty Map: Iraq's Borders and the Legend of the Artificial
2 4
State (Part 1), JADALIYYA (June 2, 2015), https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/3 1 0
[https://perma.cc/AZ6G-HUN2] (archived Nov. 10, 2019). Neither of these critiques
appeared in major newspapers or other mainstream venues and so the dominant view of
Sykes-Picot as the root of an "unraveling" Middle East remained largely uncorrected
among policymakers and general audiences.
See generally Itamar Rabinovitch, The End of Sykes-Picot? Reflections on the
14.
Prospects of the Arab State System, 32 BROOKINGS MIDDLE E. MEMO (2014).
See generally Patrick Cockburn, Is It the End of Sykes-Picot?, LONDON REV.
15.
BOOKS (June 6, 2013), https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v35/nl1/patrick-cockburn/is-itthe-end-of-sykes-picot [https://perma.cc/K9TG-DTKB] (archived Dec. 30, 2019).
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concerning the redrawing of borders from Yemen' 6 to Libya1 7 to Syria18
continue to be discussed prominently by journalists, analysts, and
scholars of the Middle East.
The underlying argument connecting these analyses is that the
"artificial" boundaries that were drawn by European colonial powers
produced fault lines that have driven conflicts in the region.1 9 A

century later, the argument continues, those borders are being erased
by events on the ground that are reshaping the distribution of power
between communities and the lines that divide them.2 0 The purported

erasure of the Iraq-Syria border by ISIS fighters in 2014 may have
been the most commonly invoked example of this phenomenon. 2 1 But
the assessment that existing states are fracturing was shared by some
American officials as well, who commented that the -partitioning of

16.
See, e.g., Vincent Lafaso, Could Yemen Be on the Way Towards Inevitable
Partition?
Analysis,
EURASIA
REv.
(Feb.
2,
2018),
https://www.eurasiareview.com/02022018-could-yemen-be-on-way-towards-inevitablepartition-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/QA7Y-8QQ7] (archived Nov. 10, 2019); Bruce~
Riedel, Is Yemen Headed for Partition?,AL-MONITOR (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.al-.
monitor.com/pulse/ru/originals/2016/10/yemen-war-houthis-saudi-arabia-partition.html
[https://perma.cc/UR2Y-ZPLL] (archived Nov. 10, 2019).
17.
See, e.g., Stephanie Kirchgaessner & Julian Borger, Trump Aide Drew Plan
on Napkin to Partition Libya into Three, GUARDIAN " (Apr. 10, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/10/libya-partition-trump-administrationsebastian-gorka [https://perma.cc/M3U6-RDWG] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (discussing
proposed plan to divide Libya); Libya: Controlling Oil, Fearing Partition, ARAB CTR.
WASH. D.C. (July 16, 2018), http://arabcenterdc.org/policyanalyses/libya-controlling-oilfearing-partition/ [https://perma.cc/GE7A-ASCW] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (discussing
the geographic implications of divisions in Libya).
18.
See Carol E.B. Choksy & Jamsheed K. Choksy, To Resolve the Syrian Crisis,
Partition

Is

Necessary,

YALE

GLOB.

ONLINE

(May

9,

2017),

https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/resolve-syrian-crisis-partition-necessary
[https://perma.cc/H33C-C7F6] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (describing proposed partition
plan for Syria).
19.
See, e.g., Robin Wright, How the Curse of Sykes-Picot Still Haunts the Middle
East, NEW YORKER (Apr. 30, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/howthe-curse-of-sykes-picot-still-haunts-the-middle-east
[https://perma.cc/9SJH-YJG2]
(archived Nov. 10, 2019) (noting that the Sykes-Picot map "is still viewed as the root
cause of much that has happened ever since").
20.
See Thomas L. Friedman, Obama on the World, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/opinion/president-obama-thomas-l-friedman-iraqand-world-affairs.html [https://perma.cc/C9RE-EEYQ] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (former
U.S. President Barack Obama stating that "[he does] believe that what we're seeing in
the Middle East and parts of North Africa is an order that dates back to World War I
starting to buckle").
21.
See, e.g., James Miller, Why Islamic State Militants Care So Much About
Sykes-Picot, RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO LIB. (May 16, 2016), https://www.rferl.org/a/whyislamic-state-cares-so-much-about-sykes-picot/27738467.html
[https://perma.cc/7NF2STNK] (archived Nov. 10, 2019); Charles M. Sennott, How ISIS is Tearing Up the
Century-Old Map of the Middle East, PUB. RADIO INT'L .(June 17, 2014),
https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-06-17/how-isis-tearing-century-old-map-middle-east
[https://perma.cc/PFX2-A8NY] (archived Nov. 10, 2019); Ruthven, supra note 7.
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Syria into two or three states and the secession of Kurds from Iraq were
22
possible outcomes of current conflicts. More recently, such projections
concerning redrawn boundaries have been extended to additional
23
countries in the region experiencing civil conflict.
Frequently, the laments about the imperial line drawing of the
post-World War I era are written by enthusiastic contemporary
24
cartographers, eager to take pen to paper to draft new maps. Indeed,
in the
arose
while the most recent wave of attention to Sykes-Picot
25
aftermath of a 2014 ISIS video, proposals for new maps of the region
began to proliferate well before ISIS emerged on the scene or the
centenary loomed on the horizon. Beginning shortly after the 2003 Iraq
invasion and the sectarian conflict that ensued, latter-day mapmakers
began to translate their analyses of a destabilized Arab world into new
borders that would, it was imagined, provide for a more stable set of
26

political arrangements.
Proposals for new borders are a puzzling recipe for a more stable
or peaceful Middle East. A cardinal principle of the international legal

See Ken Dilanian, Intelligence Chief: Iraq and Syria May Not Survive As
22.
2015),
10,
(Sept.
NEWS
A.P.
States,
9
[https://perma.cc/A4QZhttps://apnews.com/adOd463fl6f24879aaefebe2a3ce6O
MYAE] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (quoting Lt. Gen. Vincent Stewart, head of the Defense
Intelligence Agency: "On Iraq, Stewart said he is 'wrestling with the idea that the Kurds
will come back to a central government of Iraq,' suggesting he believed it was unlikely.
On Syria, he added: 'I can see a time in the future where Syria is fractured into two or
three parts."').
See, e.g., Guma El-Gamaty, Opinion, Regional Interference Is Threatening
23.
2018),
7,
(Mar.
JAZEERA
AL
State,
One
As
Future
Libya's
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/regional-interference-threatening-libyafuture-state-180307133334067.html [https://perma.cc/LDS4-ZVWQ] (archived Nov. 10,
2019) (discussing Libya's need for a stable, legitimate centralized government); Imad K.
Harb, Opinion, The Looming Partition of Yemen, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 20, 2019),
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/looming-partition-yemen10, 2019)
(archived Nov.
[https://perma.cc/V522-FLZX]
190819143901514.html
(discussing how the UAE's withdrawal of troops from Yemen catalyzed the prospective
partition of Yemen).
See infra Part III (proposing new, alternative boundary lines).
24.
See Mark Tran & Matthew Weaver, Isis Announces Islamic Caliphatein Area
25.
2014),
30,
(June
GUARDIAN
Syria,
and
Iraq
Straddling
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/30/isis-announces-islamic-caliphate-iraqsyria [https://perma.cc/DFN6-ZNCS] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (in June 2014, ISIS
declared that it was creating an Islamic "caliphate" in a region spanning parts of Iraq
and Syria. The declaration was accompanied by the release of a video, titled "The End of
Sykes Picot" that showed the razing of an apparent border marker between Iraq and
Syria. ISIS propagandists claimed that joining territories straddling the Iraq-Syria
border amounted to an erasure of the border once set by the Sykes-Picot Agreement); see
also supra note 21 (discussing resurgence of critiques of Sykes-Picot).
26.
See Ralph Peters, Blood Borders: How a Better Middle East Would Look,
ARMED FORCES J. (June 1, 2006), http://armedforcesjournal.com/blood-borders/
[https://perma.cc/7XYF-G9LU] (archived Nov. 10, 2019). This was the earliest such mapmaking exercise that garnered significant attention. It argued explicitly that an
adjustment of borders to reflect the underlying ethno-sectarian demographics of the
region would produce a "more peaceful Middle East." Id.
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order, uti possidetis, begins from the exact opposite premise. 27 This
principle-that borders may not be shifted other than as provided by
treaty-was developed in its modern form to require that the newly
formed sovereign states that emerged from decolonization retain their
colonial borders precisely to avoid territorial conflict. 28 That is,
international law settled on a rule that prized peace over justice.
Despite the normative problems with colonial border drawing, this rule

opts to preserve existing boundaries to avoid the inevitable wars of
territorial acquisition that would ensue should the status of those
boundaries be challenged.2 9 Understanding that all borders are at
some level artificial-as identity does not naturally coincide with

geography-preserving

these borders

was

deemed

better

than

shedding blood in pursuit of adjustments.3 0 Why then, in the Middle
East, do new borders hold potential appeal as a conflict resolution
strategy where everywhere else the preservation of borders has been
deemed essential to international peace and stability?
This question is an important one to address because the idea of
revised borders to resolve conflicts in the region has recurred with
some regularity over the last fifteen years among not only
commentators but also American policymakers across the political
spectrum. 3 1 With particular focus on Iraq and Syria, the idea that

27.

See

Fozia

Lone,

Uti

Possidetis

Iuris,

OXFORD

BIBLIOGRAPHIES,

https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo9780199796953-0065.xml (last updated May 26, 2016) [https://perma.cc/26EU-22DR]
(archived Nov. 10, 2019) (describing principle of uti possidetis luris).
28.
Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina Faso v. Mali), Advisory Opinion, 1986 I.C.J.
Rep. 554, ¶ 20 (Dec. 22) ("[Uti possidetis] is a general principle, which is logically
connected with the phenomenon of obtaining independence, wherever it occurs. Its
obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and stability of new states being
endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the changing of frontiers following the
withdrawal of the administering power.").
29.
For an early sketch of my argument on this point, see generally Ash Bali,
Sykes-Picot and 'Artificial States, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 115 (Sept. 28, 2016),
https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/Bali,%20Sykes%20Picot%20and%20Artificial%2
OStates.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK7F-K8KE] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (arguing that rule
of peace over justice prevents wars that would stem from territorial challenges).
30.
See generally Enver Hasani, Uti PossidetisJuris:From Rome to Kosovo, 27
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 85 (2003) (discussing the principle of uti possidetis juris as it
has applied to defining post-colonial borders).
31.
See John R. Bolton, John Bolton: To Defeat ISIS, Create a Sunni State, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/opinion/john-bolton-todefeat-isis-create-a-sunni-state.html [https://perma.ccY3GG-8XJ9] (archived Nov. 10,
2019);
Juan
Cole,
Partitioning
Iraq,
SALON
(Oct.
30,
2006),
https://www.salon.com/2006/10/30/iraqpartition/
[https://perma.cc/E77K-5HBQ]
(archived Nov. 10, 2019) (noting that '[b]oth Republicans and Democrats have endorsed
a loose Iraqi federation of three equal parts"); Leslie Gelb, The Three-State Solution, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 25, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/25/opinion/the-three-statesolution.html?auth=login-email&login=email
[https://perma.cc/R674-4R7Z] (archived
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partition may be the optimal-or indeed the only-way to address
identity conflicts in these countries has been given voice by prominent
32
While the specific maps that have
Democrats and Republicans.

proliferated have largely been drawn up by analysts distant from the
corridors of power, they reflect and distill an off-the-shelf conventional
wisdom that might yet make its way into official policies of the United

States as it seeks new avenues to address ongoing conflicts in the
region. Moreover, the recurrence of formulae for conflict resolution
through partition from the Dayton Accords to the present suggests the
33
need to address the premises that support such proposals.
This Article examines the appeal of revising borders by querying
the underlying logic of the new cartographers. Why do these analysts
believe that setting new borders in the region would produce a more
stable or peaceful Middle East? The answer lies in three propositions
that they embrace. First, Sykes-Picot symbolizes the view that there
was something peculiarly arbitrary and illegitimate about the
particular borders of the Arab state system that came into existence in

Nov. 10, 2019) (proposing the division of Iraq into three separate states); James
Stavridis, It's Time to Seriously Consider PartitioningSyria, FOREIGN POL'Y MAG. (Mar.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/09/its-time-to-seriously-consider2016),
9,
partitioning-syria/ [https://perma.cc/58VT-K93E] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (arguing the
partitioning of Syria can end conflict and foster negotiation); Bret Stephens, The Only
Syrian Solution, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2016), https://www.wsj.comlarticles/the-onlysyrian-solution-1473116696 [https://perma.cc/PC3T-ZX28] (archived Nov. 10, 2019)
(advocating for the partitioning of Syria).
See Tara Copp, 'IraqIs No More': Congress, Pentagon Coming To Terms with
32.
2015),
17,
(June
EXAMINER
WASH.
Split,
3-way
https://www. washingtonexaminer.com/iraq-is-no-more-congress-pentagon-coming-toterms-with-3-way-split [https://perma.cc/WK4X-GF6P] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (as
Secretary of Defense under the Obama administration, Ash Carter stated in
congressional testimony, "What if a multisectarian Iraq turns out not to be possible? ...
[W]e will still try to enable local ground forces, if they're willing to partner with us, to
keep stability in Iraq, but there will not be a single state of Iraq."); Mike Huckabee Lays
Out Path to 2016 Republican Nomination;Amb. John Bolton Talks NSA Surveillance,
Growth of ISIS, Fox News (May 24, 2015), https://www.foxnews.com/transcript/mikehuckabee-lays-out-path-to-2016-republican-nomination-amb-john-bolton-talks-nsasurveillance-growth-of-isis [https://perma.cc/H36X-ZASE] (archived Nov. 10, 2019)
(John Bolton, who served as National Security Advisor under the Trump administration
(2018-19), commented in 2015 that "I think our objective should be a new Sunni state
out of the western part of Iraq, the eastern part of Syria run by moderates or at least
authoritarians who are not radical Islamists.").
33.

See MARINA

OTI'AWAY & MAI EL-SADANY,

SUDAN: FROM

CONFLICT TO

CONFLICT, CARNEGIE PAPERS 1 (2012) (arguing "[aill signs suggest that the transition
from greater Sudan to the Republics of Sudan and South Sudan is not the end of a conflict
but rather the beginning of multiple new ones"); Conner Gordon, The Dangers of
2016),
16,
(May
POST
PRINDLE
Peace,
as
Partition
[https://perma.cc/J4EU-B88F]
https://www.prindlepost.org/2016/05/ethnic-partition/
(archived Nov. 10, 2019) (critiquing the logic of partition in the Dayton Accords); see also
Peter Lippman, Bosnia's Politics of Paralysis, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Oct. 19, 2010),
[https://perma.cc/7ZYL-VGTA]
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/peter-lippman/
(archived Nov. 10, 2019) (discussing problems with Bosnia's post-war settlement
agreement).
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the post-World War I period. 34 Second, this illegitimacy is frequently
located in the alleged disconnect between the borders that were drawn
on paper and the underlying ethno-sectarian makeup of the
populations living in post-Ottoman lands. 35 Lastly, the instability that
is now engulfing parts of the Levant, Mesopotamia, and even North
Africa is understood to be a consequence of the collapse of Arab states
that were never able to produce a coherent "nation" out of the
heterogeneous populations within their borders. 36 These states ruled
by coercion rather than consent over societies characterized by deep
identitarian cleavages. 3 7 They are now coming undone as a result of
popular revolt that has weakened their monopoly on coercion. 38 One
prominent political scientist has argued that Iraq and Syria, among
others, are "devolving into .. . 'quasi-states,' internationally recognized

de jure as sovereign even though they cannot implement de facto the
functional requisites that sovereignty assumes." 3 9 The new
cartographers argue that resolving the conflicts that have caused state

34. Dan Williams, Bloodshed blurs Middle East borders set 100 years ago by UKFrench pact, REUTERS, May 16, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisisisrael-borders/bloodshed-blurs-middle-east-borders-set-100-years-ago-by-uk-frenchpact-idUSKCN0Y71LS [https://perma.cc/GH5L-7DAC (archived Mar. 22, 2020) (noting
there is "support among many Arabs for deeming Sykes-Picot dead ... to solemnize the
end of often arbitrary Western-imposed boundaries.").
35.
See Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Ethnic Conflict and State-Building in the Arab
World, 50 INT'L SOC. SCI. J. 229, 232 (2002) (arguing that colonial designs led to the
"fragmentation of the Arab world" into territorial states with "equally fragmented ethnic
minorities," highlighting the relationship between ethnic conflict and state formation in
the Middle East).
36.
See infra Part II. See generallyRaffaella A. Del Sarto, Contentious Borders in
the Middle East and North Africa: Contexts and Concepts, 93 INT'L AFF. 767 (July 2017)
(assessing the relationship between legitimacy, borders, and state formation in the
Middle East).
37.
See, e.g., Ariel I. Ahram & Ellen Lust, The Decline and Fallof the Arab State,
58 SURVIVAL: GLOBAL POL. & STRATEGY 7, 17 (2016) ("With the state's coercive grip
suddenly weakened all kinds of political movements came forward to make claims. Some
opposition movements sought to upend regimes while laying claim to the entirety of
existing unitary states. Others tried to carve out new territorial foundations for
statehood or reinstate previously discarded ones."); Aleksa Djilas, Tito's Last Secret: How
Did He Keep Yugoslavia Together?, 74 FOREIGN AFF. 116 (July 1995) (explaining the rise
of ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia following the death of its long-term authoritarian leader,
Jsip Broz Tito).
38.
See, e.g., Adham Saouli, Back to the future: the Arab uprisings and state
(re)formationin the Arab world, 22 DEMOCRATIZATION 315 (2015) (arguing that the Arab
uprisings have produced state fragmentation).
39.
F. Gregory Gause III, Is This the End of Sykes-Picot?, WASH. POST (May 20,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/20/is-this-theend-of-sykes-picot/ [https://perma.cc/Z644-XEP3] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (citing
ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE

THIRD WORLD (Cambridge Univ. Press 1993) (questioning the normative desirability of
extending juridical sovereignty to post-colonial states unable to exercise the positive
functions of statehood)).
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failure requires drawing new and better lines that will produce more
governable territories with cohesive communities that are more likely
to adhere to territorial boundaries reflecting their communal
40
identities.
To assess these propositions, this Article begins first by briefly
reviewing the history of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the
subsequent treaties that came to define the borders of the modern Arab
state system. In what ways were these borders especially artificial or
flawed? Next, this Article considers some of the alternative maps that
have circulated among commentators and policy analysts to describe
the benefits ascribed to newly proposed borders by their authors. If
Arab "quasi-states" were illegitimate as a consequence of borders that
assembled disparate peoples under a single juridical sovereign, such
maps suggest that new borders offer the promise of stability grounded
in demography. Lastly, this Article critically examines the logic of
deriving cartography from demography. This Article is particularly
concerning the
how arguments
interested in understanding
illegitimacy of externally imposed borders a century ago have given
way to defenses of new borders on maps drawn by experts in the West.
In conclusion, this Article suggests alternative avenues-including
decentralizing reforms-that may hold some potential for addressing
the sources of current conflict in the region without resorting to
4
shifting existing state boundaries. i

II. UNDERSTANDING SYKES-PICOT AND ITS PROGENY
If there is one thing that historians of the modern Middle East can
agree on, it is that the borders of the region were not set by the Sykes42
Picot Agreement. The most obvious sense in which this is true is that

&

In one such map-making exercise, the experts who gathered to discuss new
40.
borders in the region noted that they were offering a descriptive rather than prescriptive
account to "discern configurations that implicitly already exist." See Cullen Murphy
24, 2008),
(Feb.
Lines in the Sand, VANITY FAIR
Hussein,
Haisam
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2008/01/middle-east-cultural-political-map
[https://perma.cc/2ZDN-UVSS] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (providing a map by four
experts-David Fromkin, Dennis Ross, Kenneth Pollack and Daniel Byman-invited to
"chart the region's more 'natural' divisions as they look today.").
41.

See LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLIC GOODS: ASSESSING DECENTRALIZATION

IN THE ARAB WORLD (Mona Harb & Sami Atallah eds., 2015) (discussing current efforts
at decentralization in the Arab region).
See, e.g., James Gelvin, Don't Blame Sykes-Picot, OUP BLOG (Feb. 7, 2015),
42.
[https://perma.cc/T7HZ-5ARX]
http://blog.oup.com/2015/02/dont-blame-sykes-picot/
(archived Nov. 10, 2019) (arguing modern-day borders of the Middle East were not
determined by the Sykes-Picot Agreement because it "was already a dead letter" after
World War I).
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the agreement was never implemented.4 3 More generally, the SykesPicot Agreement was one link in a long chain of agreements that
determined more or less the boundaries that were established in the
region following the breakup of the Ottoman Empire. It was not the
first,44 nor would it be the last,45 in the chain, and it is arguable
whether it was among the most consequential.4 6 Yet, in popular

commentary, "Sykes-Picot has become a clich6, an all-purpose lament
for the unjust and ill-thought-out carving up of the Ottoman Empire

after World War I."47 As one historian has noted, Sykes-Picot's
symbolic significance far outweighs its historical significance. 4 8 For
those in the Middle East, the agreement symbolizes Western attempts
to keep the region divided. 49 And in the West, the agreement stands

43.
See Umut Ozsu, Why Sykes-Picot Is (Still) Important, OUP BLOG (June 6,
2016),
https:/fblog.oup.com/2016/06/why-sykes-picot-is-still-important/
[https://perma.cc/KL2R-LG94] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (Sykes-Picot Agreement "was not
implemented directly or comprehensively").
44.
Among earlier significant agreements, for example, was the "Reglement
Organique" that separated Mount Lebanon from Syria. An international commission
composed of France, Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia and the Ottoman Empire came to
a joint agreement, following fighting between the Maronite and Druze communities in
1860, that the territory would be given a semi-autonomous status governed in
consultation with an administrative council representing the various religious
communities inhabiting the region (Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Druze, Sunni, Shi'a, and
Melkite). See generally CAESAR E. FARAH, POLITIcS OF INTERVENTIONISM IN OTTOMAN
LEBANON 1830-61 (2000) (describing international involvement in Ottoman Lebanon).
45.
The final link in the chain came in 1939 with the cession of
Alexandretta/Hatay province from the French mandate of Syria to Turkey. This
territorial change was a consequence of an arrangement brokered by the League of
Nations that first separated Alexandretta/Hatay from the rest of mandate Syria in 1937
and then, following a highly contested popular referendum, witnessed a French-Turkish
agreement for the Turkish annexation of the province. See EMMA JORUM, BEYOND
SYRIA'S BORDERS: A HISTORY OF TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN THE MIDDLE EAST 91-94

(2014).
46.
See, e.g., Nick Danforth, Forget Sykes-Picot. It's the Treaty of Sevres That
Explains the Modern Middle East, FOREIGN
POL'Y (Aug.
10,
2015),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/10/sykes-picot-treaty-of-sevres-modern-turkeymiddle-east-borders-turkey/ [https://perma.cc/UF7V-HYA8] (archived Nov. 10, 2019)
(arguing for the influence and importance of the Treaty of Sevres).
47.
Sean McMeekin, In the Mideast, Borders Have Always Been Drawn in Blood,
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2015), https://www.latimes.comopinion/op-ed/la-oe-0322mcmeekin-middle-east-sykes-picot-boundaries-20150322-story.html
[https://perma.cc/PQ4P-NGR] (archived Nov. 10, 2019).
48.
See James Gelvin, Obsession with Sykes-Picot Says More About What We
Think
of
Arabs
Than
History,
CONVERSATION
(May
12,
2016),
https://theconversation.com/obsession-with-sykes-picot-says-more-about-what-wethink-of-arabs-than-history-58775 [https://perma.cc/8WJB-CUUF] (archived Nov. 10,
2019) (noting Sykes-Picot's significance as a metaphor for "Western treachery").
49.
See, e.g., Robert Johnson, The de Bunsen Committee and a revision of the
'conspiracy'ofSykes-Picot, 54 MIDDLE E. STUD. 611, 611 (2018) (noting that the "SykesPicot Agreement is often cited as evidence of a Western conspiracy to carve up the Middle
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for an understanding of the Middle East as "irrevocably divided into
mutually hostile sects and clans, destined to be mired in conflict until
another external intervention imposes a new, more authentic, set of
0
political units."5 To understand why Sykes-Picot has taken on these
5
mythic ' proportions it would be helpful to better understand the
context for the agreement, its substantive terms, and the developments
that followed.
A. The End of an Imperial Era
The Ottoman Empire had acquired the sobriquet the "sick man of
52
Europe" by the end of the nineteenth century. As the indebted empire
sought to modernize everything from its military to its banking
institutions, it fell under the financial control of European powers and
53
The decline of the
lost its Balkan territories to wars of independence.
empire was not unique-the Hapsburgs of the Austro-Hungarian
empire and the Romanovs of the Russian empire faced a similar

decline. 54 By the end of World War I, all three of these empires were
defunct. Russia was engulfed by a prolonged civil war and the AustroHungarian empire dissolved into smaller successor states making up a
55
The fate of the Ottomans was
redrawn map of Eastern Europe.
distinct, however, in that its Anatolian territories were occupied and
its Arab territories partitioned and subjected to imperial mandates
overseen by the victorious European parties to the war.56

East and subordinate the Arabs ... a prevalent view across the region."); Larry Hannant,
100 years on: Why the Sykes-Picot pact is still hated in the Mideast, GLOBE & MAIL (May
9, 2016), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/100-years-on-why-the-sykes-picot929
[https://perma.cc/GMR5-FSAG]
515/
pact-is-still-hated-in-the-mideast/article29
8 (noting that the Agreement "epitomized the
note
supra
Muir,
2020);
14,
Mar.
(archived
concept of clandestine colonial carve-ups . . . [and] has become the label for the whole era
in which outside powers imposed their will, drew borders and installed client local
leaderships, playing divide-and-rule with the 'natives' .... "); Why Arabs Resent SykesPicot, supra note 6.
Toby Dodge, The Danger of Analogical Myths: Explaining the Power and
50.
Consequencesof the Sykes-Picot Delusion, 110 AM. J. INT'L L. UNBOUND 132 (2016).
See, e.g., David Siddhartha Patel, Repartitioningthe Sykes-Picot Middle East?
51.
Debunking Three Myths, 103 MIDDLE E. BRIEF (2016) (challenging myths surrounding
the Sykes-Picot Agreement).
M.E. YAPP, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN NEAR EAST 1792-1923, at 92-93
52.
(2013).
See ROGAN, supra note 1, at 14.
53.
54.
See MICHAEL D. BERDINE, REDRAWING THE MIDDLE EAST: SIR MARK SYKES,
IMPERIALISM AND THE SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT 86-87, 125 (2018); FROMKIN, supra note

2, at 239-49 (explaining decline of Russian Empire); see also FROMKIN, supranote 2, at
434 (explaining decline of Austro-Hungarian Empire).
See YAPP, supra note 52, at 60-69.
55.
56.

See generally STANFORD J. SHAW & EZEL KURAL SHAW, HISTORY OF THE

OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND MODERN TURKEY (1977) (describing history of the period of the
Ottoman decline and eventual defeat in World War I).
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That the allies in the war would have concluded a number of

agreements to determine the postwar fate of the Ottoman territories
was hardly surprising. Secret treaties and diplomacy over spheres of

influence and managing trade and commercial competition were longstanding tools for preserving the imperial balance of power amongst
European states on the continent and abroad in their colonial

possessions. 57 By the end of the nineteenth century significant rivalries

had already emerged between France, Britain, and Russia concerning
their respective stakes in and influence over the Ottoman territories. 58
The defeat of the Ottomans would surely be marked by competition
over the division of lands and assets had the allies not sought a prior
understanding among themselves as part of their war strategy.
The Ottomans entered the war fighting with the Central Powers
following a Russian declaration of war.59 Because the Ottomans were
fighting Allied forces on the Middle Eastern front, British and French
war planners developed a two-pronged approach. 60 First, they sought

to cultivate an indigenous revolt against the Turks to hasten Ottoman
military defeat. 6 1 Second, they began negotiating between themselves
their respective claims to head off a secondary European conflict over
Middle Eastern lands at the end of the war.6 2 The twin objectives were
given expression first in the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence of
1915 and then in a separate agreement between the British and French
in 1916.63 Sharif Hussein, who was leading the Hashemite revolt
against the Ottomans in Arabia, was promised a united Arab kingdom
with vague boundaries that would exclude British positions in the
Ottoman provinces of Iraq and French claims on Ottoman Syria. 6 4
Following this broad agreement, the British invited the French to send

57.
Megan Donaldson, Textual Settlements: The Sykes-Picot Agreement and
Secret Treaty-Making, 110 AM. J. INT'L L. UNBOUND 127, 127 (2016).
58.

WILLIAM L. CLEVELAND & MARTIN BUNTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN

MIDDLE EAST 95 (5th ed. 2013).
59.
See ROGAN, supra note 1, at 51, 75.
60.
See id. at 75.
61.
See id. at 230, 276 (discussing the Hussein-McMahon correspondence as part
of an effort to encourage Arab revolt); FROMKIN, supra note 2, at 222.
62.
See Eugene Rogan, A Century After Sykes-Picot, CAIRO REV. GLOB. AFF.
(2015),
https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/a-century-after-sykes-picot/
[https://perma.c/S95K-VUGX] (archived Nov. 11, 2019) (discussing the positions and
objectives of the British and French leading up to the Sykes-Picot Agreement); see also
ROGAN, supra note 1.
63.
JAMES BARR, A LINE IN THE SAND: BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE STRUGGLE THAT
SHAPED THE MIDDLE EAST 17-26 (2011).
64.
MICHAEL PROVENCE, THE LAST OTTOMAN GENERATION AND THE MAKING OF
THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST 63 (2017).
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representatives to London to determine the extent of their demands in

Syria. 65 The stage was thus set for the Sykes-Picot Agreement.
B. Sykes-Picot66
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much as a map dividing areas of direct administration from zones of
influence.68 The former represented territories that would remain
under European administration while the latter territories would be
zones of indirect control, which might lend themselves to the Arab

65. See generally Edward P. Fitzgerald, France'sMiddle Eastern Ambitions, the
Sykes-Picot Negotiations and the Oil Fields of Mosul, 1915-1918, 66 J. MOD. HIST. 697
(1994) (discussing British and French discussions in London regarding Syria).
1916,
15,
May
Brit.-Fr.,
Gr.
Agreement,
Sykes-Picot
66.
See
[https://perma.ce/26NYhttps://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Sykes-Picot_Agreement
ZKJJ] (last visited Mar. 4, 2020) (archived Nov. 11, 2019). The original Sykes-Picot map
has been reproduced in every modern history of the Middle East. See Ruthven, supra
note 7 (reproducing the images distributed by ISIS).
This simplified mapping of the division of the region produced by the Sykes67.
Picot Agreement can be found here: https://i.redd.it/aw2mcfz3iwy11.png (last visited

Mar. 4, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ZX4S-GC6S] (archived Mar. 4, 2020) [hereinafter SykesPicot Map].
BERDINE, supra note 54, at 79-80.
68.
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kingdom promised to the Hashemites or might become quasiindependent states in some other formulation. 69

To conduct these negotiations, the French sent Frangois, GeorgesPicot their former consul general in Beirut, to meet with Mark Sykes,

Middle East adviser of the British War Secretary Lord Herbert
Kitchener. 70 The agreement and attendant map reflected various
Ottoman administrative demarcations (the Sykes-Picot lines were
drawn on an Ottoman map, transliterated into Latin characters, that

clearly showed these designations) as well as positions of influence
already occupied by Britain and France respectively in Mesopotamia
and the Levant by 1916.71 By contrast, the map they drew does not
correspond to the modern boundaries of Arab states, as illustrated by
consulting the map above, which shows Sykes-Picot overlaid onto a
map of the contemporary Middle East. 7 2
The orange area shown on the map was to be under direct British
rule and contained the Ottoman provinces of Basra and Baghdad, as

well as a portion of what is today Kuwait and the Gulf coast of Saudi
Arabia. The Anbar region of western Iraq was included in the British
sphere of influence while Mosul province was in the French sphere of
influence. The Ottoman designation for the cluster of three provinces
(Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul), "Irak Arabi," is clearly visible on the
original Sykes-Picot map even as the lines drawn sever the historic ties
between Mosul and the other provinces of Ottoman "Irak."73
The blue area shown on the map was to be under direct French
control and contained a large part of southeastern Anatolia together
with the eastern Mediterranean coast from Alexandretta through
Damascus and down to Palestine. In other words, this area does not
correspond to the political boundaries of any current states in the
region but encompasses all of Lebanon and parts of Turkey, Syria, and
historic Palestine. The description inscribed on the underlying

69.

CHRISTOPHER SIMON SYKES, THE MAN WHO CREATED THE MIDDLE EAST 258-

59 (William Collins 2016) (noting that non-Arab communities, like the Kurds, with a
significant presence on these lands were not acknowledged in the arrangements
sketched on the Sykes-Picot map).
70.
See BARR, supra note 63, at 25.
71.
See Karin Loevy, Railways, Ports, and Irrigation: The Forgotten Regional
Landscape of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, 36 B.U. INT'L L.J. 287, 333-34 (2018).
72.
David Gardner, Middle East: Cracking Up, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2013),
https://www.ft.com/content/82550c80-4c7e- 11e3-958f-00144feabdcO
[https://perma.cc/92CF-D9CW] (archived Nov. 11, 2019) (including the map superimposing the map accompanying the Sykes-Picot agreement on the modern borders of
the Middle East).
73.
See
Sykes-Picot
Agreement,
WIKIPEDIA
(2019),
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sykes%E2%80%93PicotAgreement#/media/File:MPK1426_SykesPicotAgreementMapsigned_8_May_1916.jpg
[https://perma.cc/29K79QT2] (archived Nov. 11, 2019) (image of the original map appended to the Sykes-Picot
Agreement).
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Ottoman map reads "Syria" in capital letters running from Palestine
to just inland of Latakia. This area, known as greater Syria for the
Ottomans, encompassed provinces from Jaffa in the south up to Aleppo
in the north, including inland areas that lie in contemporary Jordan.
The central area of the map is divided into "A" and "B" territories
that were to become an "independent Arab state" or a "confederation of
Arab states" with the northern A region envisioned as a French sphere
of influence and the southern B region as a British sphere of
influence. 74 The agreement on the ultimate status of these territories
was left ambiguous, possibly to enable the eventual reconciling of this
map with the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence, allowing the
designated spheres of influence to serve as the basis for a single
75 The terms of the agreement equally suggest
independent Arab state.
that these zones might eventually become the basis for two Arab states
each with significant economic concessions for the respective colonial
for
designated
separately
was
Palestine
Finally,
powers. 76
international administration, the ultimate form of which was to be
77
determined based on consultation with the Russians.
The only border of present-day Iraq that corresponds in any way
to the Sykes-Picot lines is the southern section of the border with Syria.
Under the terms of the agreement, this was not actually a border for
the British administered Iraq region but rather a part of the boundary
between the A and B spheres of influence. Moreover, when this border
was eventually established between present-day Syria and Iraq, it was
not on the basis of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, but relied on earlier
Ottoman administrative designations together with demands made by
78
local resistance movements. The remainder of the lines on the SykesPicot map do not correspond to any of the contemporary borders of the
Arab world. Indeed, the swath of territory that ISIS sought to control
in 2014 corresponds to the French sphere of influence designated by
the Sykes-Picot map, joining central and eastern Syria with the Mosul
province of Iraq. 79 Rather than erasing the Sykes-Picot boundaries,
ISIS unwittingly worked to resurrect them.

See BARR, supra note 63, at 26 (the division reflected an entirely Arabized
74.
conception of the post-Ottoman trajectory of these territories).
See YAPP, supra note 52, at 278-80.
75.
See BARR, supra note 63, at 26.
76.
See Sykes-Picot Map, supra note 67 (the Palestinian cities of Acre and Haifa,
77.
however, were carved out as areas of British administration, as is visible on the map).
Reidar Visser, Proto-PoliticalConceptions of 'Iraq'in Late Ottoman Times, 3
78.
INT'L J. CONTEMP. IRAQI STUD. (2009).
Sara Pursley provides this important observation in her excellent two-part
79.
essay on Iraq's borders, critiquing David Fromkin. See Pursley, supra note 13 (observing
ISIS's sought-for land corresponded with the French area on the Sykes-Picot map,
critiquing David Fromkin).
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C. Setting the Borders: Facts on the Ground over Lines on the Map
The Sykes-Picot Agreement was overtaken by events long before
it could be implemented. 80 The agreement itself was concluded at the
high point of Anglo-French imperial ambition and optimism,
confidence that was shaken by the end of the war with the intervention
of the Americans. 8 1 The British contribution to the war effort in the

Middle East was far greater than the French and, inevitably, the
distribution of territory and zones of influence was destined to shift. 82
Moreover further commitments had been made in the years between
Sykes-Picot and the end of the war, not least the Balfour Declaration, 83
which would require direct British control over Palestine rather than
an international administration. 84 Following the 1918 armistice, a

meeting between French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau and
British Prime Minister Lloyd George renegotiated the respective
shares of Ottoman Arab territories accorded to each country. 85 This
revision awarded the British the control they desired over Palestine
and annexed to the British sphere of influence the Mosul province,
which had become strategically significant with the discovery of oil. 8 6
At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the gap between the
various Anglo-French agreements and the Hussein-McMahon
Correspondence became apparent. 8 7 The head of the Arab delegation
to the conference, Sharif Hussein's son, Faisal, demanded an Arab
Kingdom through the union of Ottoman greater Syria (with
international mediation on the question of Palestine) and the Hijaz
(already ruled by Hussein). 88 To secure their own claims over Iraq, the

80.
Indeed, most of the Anglo-French agreements during the war were revisited
or jettisoned after the armistice. For example, the earlier Constantinople Agreement was
another set of secret commitments by the British-French-Russian triple entente during
the war, assigning the straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean to Russia.
The agreement became moot with Russia's withdrawal from the war. See FROMKIN,
supra note 2, at 137-55.
81.
See BARR, supra note 63 (describing rapid transformation of British and
French positions after the conclusion of the agreement); see also FROMKIN, supra note 2,
at 342-44 (noting contemporaneous denunciations of the treaty by senior British
officials).
82.
See FROMKIN, supranote 2, at 373-79.
83.
See id. at 253-99.
84.
See BERDINE, supra note 54, at 174.
85.
See BARR, supra note 63, at 56-70.
86.
See James Barr, The Divisive Line: The Birth and Long Life of the Sykes-Picot
Agreement, in RAJA SHEHADEH AND PENNY JOHNSON, SHIFTING SANDS: THE UNRAVELING
OF THE OLD ORDER IN THE MIDDLE EAST 33, 45-46 (2015).

87.
See BARR, supra note 63, at 65-67.
88.
This position actually reflected a concession on the part of the Arab
delegation. Accepting international mediation of the Palestine question was a retreat
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British chose instead to honor agreements that recognized French
89
claims over Syria. The result was a new Arab revolt, this time seeking
the creation of a Syrian kingdom under Faisal. An independent Arab
kingdom of Syria was proclaimed in Damascus on March 8, 1920,
forcing the British and French to repudiate Hashemite claims to rule
and formalize the division of Ottoman territories at a conference the
90
While Faisal's forces were easily
following month in San Remo.
defeated by the French, this first revolt in 1920 marked the beginning
of a series of skirmishes involving not only the British and the French
but also local actors contesting boundaries and asserting nationalist
claims requiring territorial renegotiations from 1920 to 1939.91 These
included Arab, Armenian, Kurdish, and Turkish forces all waging
battles of resistance against the European carve up of the region,
resulting in changes on the ground that impacted the final contours of
Arab boundaries.

92

from the position taken in the earlier correspondence. But having issued the Balfour
declaration in the intervening period, the British were no longer able to accept this
concession, since they were committed to directly administering Palestine in keeping
with their Balfour commitment. See ROGAN, supra note 1, at 315. The separation of
Palestine from greater Syria was seen at the time by the local populations of the region
as the most illegitimate of the lines drawn in the aftermath of World War I. The polling
of Arab publics undertaken at the time by the American King-Crane commission in 1919
showed widespread support for Palestine remaining attached to greater Syria. On the
polling data, see James Zogby, Opinions Matter: A Lesson from History, HUFFINGTON
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/opinions-matter-a2011),
25,
(May
POST
lesson_b_112259 [https://perma.cc/4AZP-B4N6] (archived Nov. 12, 2019) (polling of Arab
publics undertaken at the time by the American King-Crane commission in 1919 showed
widespread support for Palestine remaining attached to greater Syria). See generally
James Gelvin, The Ironic Legacy of the King-Crane Commission, in THE MIDDLE EAST
AND THE UNITED STATES 13-30 (David W. Lesch ed., 2007).
89.

See CLEVELAND & BUNTON, supra note 58, at 151, 153.

The significance of San Remo for the French was to formalize the British
90.
withdrawal from Syrian territories so that they could impose terms on Faisal without
British interference. Thus, the goals of San Remo were set by Arab demands for
independence. Once Faisal was vanquished, the French still faced popular resistance in
Damascus and Aleppo, causing them to resort to a divide-and-rule strategy to further
partition of Syria in the hopes of blocking the formation of a united nationalist front
across the territory. In the end, those French subdivisions did not endure. See Ayse
Tekdal Fildis, The Troubles in Syria: Spawned by French Divide and Rule, 18 MIDDLE
E. POLY COUNCIL 4 (2011), https://www.mepc.org/troubles-syria-spawned-french-divideand-rule [https://perma.cc/JB5K-8EZJ] (archived Nov. 12, 2019) (discussing the
establishment of Syria). For a detailed discussion of the San Remo conference and the
agreement it produced, see PAUL C. HELMREICH, FROM PARIS TO SEVRES: THE PARTITION
OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1919-1920, at 291-313 (Ohio

St. Univ. Press 1974) (detailing the conference at San Remo).
91.

See DANIEL NEEP, OCCUPYING SYRIA UNDER THE FRENCH MANDATE 34-38

(Cambridge Univ. Press 2012).
See ROGAN, supranote 1, at 317-18 (the independence movements that drove
92.
these conflicts were concentrated in Syria, Iraq, the Arabian peninsula and the
Anatolian territories of Turkey. As a consequence of these conflicts, Turkey and Saudi
Arabia eventually emerged with boundaries set by their military victories rather than
European map-making. Their boundaries also determined frontiers for parts of Syria,
Iraq and Jordan, among others.).
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Less than a year after San Remo, a second conference was
convened, this time in Cairo, to address local resistance to European
administration by coming to terms with Sharif Hussein and his sons. 93
In the time between the two conferences, a nationwide revolt against
British rule in Iraq was put down through aerial bombardment and

scorched earth tactics that killed thousands of Iraqis and reportedly
also led to several hundred British deaths. 94 The insurgency against

the British began in Baghdad but quickly spread throughout Iraq,
drawing in the provincial tribes, the major urban centers, and all of the
ethnic and religious communities of the country. 95 In the aftermath of
the revolt, British officials met with their chosen Arab interlocutors at
the Cairo conference in March 1921 to resolve the conflicting
commitments they had made in the various World War I-era
agreements. 9 6 The meeting yielded a decision to create a new kingdom

in the territory east of the Jordan river for Hussein's son Abdullah, to
install Faisal as the king of Iraq, and to recognize Sharif Hussein as
the king of Hijaz. 97
The San Remo and Cairo conferences shaped European responses
to local resistance movements opposed to the Anglo-French division of
Ottoman territories. 98 As borders .were adjusted to accommodate
demands from local actors and to reconcile conflicting commitments to
Arab publics as well as European partners, 99 the lines of Sykes-Picot
were overridden and literally overwritten from 1915 to the 1930s until
little remained of the secret Anglo-French agreement.
The most definitive repudiation of European mapmaking in this
period was the Turkish war of independence that overturned the terms

of the (never ratified) Treaty of Sevres, which had apportioned much of
Anatolia between Britain, France, Greece, Italy, and the Kurdish and
Armenian populations of the region.1 00 The treaty was rendered

obsolete by military resistance by Turkish and Kurdish forces that
eventually succeeded in liberating Anatolia from occupation forces and

93.
See FROMKIN, supra note 2, at 502-03.
94.
See CHARLES TRIPP, A HISTORY OF IRAQ 40-45 (2d ed. 2002) (describing Iraq's
revolt against British rule).
95.
See id. at 40-44.
96.
See BARR, supra note 63, at 112-14.
97.
See MADAwI AL-RASHEED, A HISTORY OF SAUDI ARABIA 39-46 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2010) (ebook) (The lines dividing Hijaz from the rest of central Arabia would
eventually be redrawn by the conquest of Hijaz by the Saudis in 1924-25, establishing
new boundaries that had not been contemplated on European maps of the region.).
98.
On the outbreak of an anti-colonial revolt in Iraq in response to the San Remo
conference, see SARA PURSLEY, FAMILIAR FUTURES: TIME, SELFHOOD AND SOVEREIGNTY

IN IRAQ 37-45 (2019).
99.
On the negotiation of Iraqi borders under the British mandate by British
officials responding to the demands of local populations, see, e.g., Pursley, supra note 13.
100. See ROGAN, supra note 1, at 312.
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0 1 The resolution of the Greco-Turkish
setting the borders of Turkey.
2
War set the modern boundaries of the two stateso and indirectly
resulted in the downfall of Lloyd George, whose inability to muster the
support of European allies to defend the Dardanelles led to a
withdrawal of support in parliament, triggering a general election that
03
Territorial realities reversed not only maps
swept him from office.1
but the fortunes of mapmakers. Additional military campaigns in
Turkey eventually resulted in setting the northern borders of Syria and
04
Iraq in Article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne,1 with several additional
adjustments between 1925 and 1939 to take into account continued
05
conflicts over Mosul and Alexandretta/Hatay province.1
In the end, the frontiers that emerged in the Ottoman territories
after the fall of the empire were not only a result of European imperial
designs but also local resistance and renegotiation over a period of two
decades marked by armed border contestation and nationalist
mobilizations. As discussed above, Sykes-Picot was not controversial
because it set boundaries, since its vision of a post-Ottoman European
order for the Middle East was never implemented. Rather, it was
controversial first because of the secrecy surrounding the talks
between Sykes and Picot that produced a self-interested bilateral pact
including Arab
allies
wartime
of
interests
the
excluding
nationalists.1 06 Second, because the agreement planned to prolong
European tutelage rather than transition the post-Ottoman territories
to independence, it was seen as inconsistent with the terms of the

101.
102.

See id. at 395.
See id.

103.

See KRISTIAN COATES ULRICHSEN, THE FIRST WORLD WAR IN THE MIDDLE

EAST 178-80 (2014).
104. These military campaigns were heavily fortified by Kurdish forces who were
fighting alongside Anatolian forces in the Turkish war of independence. This military
alliance took shape under the framework of a National Pact (misak-i milli) to liberate
from foreign occupation all lands designated by the final Ottoman Parliament as
destined to be part of a Turkish homeland. These lands included both Mosul province
and parts of Aleppo province, areas with large Kurdish communities. The Kurdish
objectives in joining the Pact were to maintain the territorial integrity of the Kurdish
lands of the Ottoman territory. This goal, in turn, was connected to commitments by
Turkish leaders that after independence they would found a Muslim state composed of
Turkish and Kurdish peoples. On the vision of the National Pact as a struggle for a state
composed of the "Turkish and Kurdish remnants of the empire," see DAVID MCDOWALL,
A MODERN HISTORY OF THE KURDS 187-90 (1996). On Mustafa Kemal's commitments to
Kurdish leaders during the independence struggle, see ERIC J. ZURCHER, TURKEY: A
MODERN HISTORY 170 (2004) (ebook). These commitments were later betrayed, as will
be discussed below. See infra notes 244-245 and accompanying text.
105. On the setting of the final Turkish borders, see SARAH SHIELDS, FEZZES IN THE
RIVER: IDENTITY POLITICS AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST ON THE EVE
OF WORLD WAR II 230-44 (Oxford Univ. Press 2012).
106. See CLEVELAND & BUNTON, supra note 58, at 152. Also excluded were the
preferences of non-Arab communities, like the Kurds, present on the same territories.
See id.
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alliance between the British and the leaders of the Arab revolt.1 0 7
Sykes-Picot was flawed not because the lines it drew were artificial,
but because they were negotiated in secret and without the
participation of local actors.1 0 8 The actual borders that emerged after

World War I bore little resemblance to Sykes-Picot and were instead a
function of later Anglo-French
renegotiations influenced by
preexisting Ottoman administrative lines and contemporaneous
resistance by local actors in battles on the ground from Anatolia to Iraq

to Palestine.

III. PROJECTS IN CONTEMPORARY CARTOGRAPHY

While most commentators and analysts might agree with the
basic empirical observation that the Sykes-Picot Agreement does not

correspond to the borders of the modern Arab state system, they would
likely defend the view that these are nonetheless artificial states
produced by a more complicated series of European agreements and
negotiations. At base, they argue, the borders of the region are fraying
because of their imperial origins and attendant artificiality.1 09 In the

words of one commentator:
Let's look at the reality on the ground in the Middle East: Iraq and Syria are
effectively partitioned along sectarian lines; Lebanon and Yemen are close to
fracturing; Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia survive intact but as increasingly
authoritarian states.... The state boundaries drawn by the Versailles Treaty in
1919 to replace the Ottoman Empire can't hold the fractious peoples together.

107. See id.
108. Sykes-Picot remains controversial in the Kurdish communities of the Middle
East for the additional reason that it revealed the erasure of Kurdistan from Western
imperial designs for a post-Ottoman order. The agreement reflected a European
conception of the region premised on its Arab identity in the parts of the empire not
inhabited by Turkish-speakers. While the Sykes-Picot map did not take any local actors'
preferences into account, its failure to even acknowledge Kurds as a community with an
equally long-standing territorial basis in the region was striking. A century later, SykesPicot was still remembered bitterly by Kurdish leaders in the region as a symbol of
western erasure of their collective claims. For example, Massoud Barzani, then the
president of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq, used the occasion of the
centenary to pursue an independence referendum. See Sangar Ali, Kurds Call for
Independence on Sykes-Picot Anniversary, KURDISTAN24
(May 16,
2016),
https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/economy/4e04350b-feel-4e57-bfdba1f25055c27e/Kurds-call-for-independence-on-Sykes-Picot-anniversary
[https://perma.cc/25ZX-VN93] (archived Nov. 10, 2019).
109. See David Ignatius, PiecingTogether the ShatteringMiddle East, WASH. POST
(June 17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-piecingtogether-the-shattering-middle-east/2014/06/17/e73812f8-f63a-11e3-a606946fd632f9f1_story.html, [https://perma.cc/V4SD-7Z7S] (archived Nov. 10, 2019)
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And a U.S.-led system that kept the region in a rough balance has been shattered
by America's failed intervention in Iraq.110

Ignatius goes on to describe the "new map" that is emerging under
these pressures. 11 1 His depiction echoes debates in the Beltway and
2
beyond concerning the potential partition of Iraq and Syria.1"

In broad strokes, Ignatius is describing the processes that have
defined the region's borders and connecting them to current
3
destabilization.11 First, the collapse of the Ottoman order, then the
end of the mandate system followed by an American-led regional
balance of power that held borders in place, and now, with the
unraveling of the American security order following the Iraq War, a
new era in which states are being fractured into what Ignatius
4
describes as "ethnic cantons."11 This diagnosis of the challenges facing
the region was shared by numerous American commentators and
analysts, with a deluge of analysis along these lines at the height of
5
ISIS' campaigns in Syria and Iraq.11 What also emerged out of this
conventional wisdom was a series of experiments in trying to design
new borders for the region.116
Beyond the initial diagnosis of what ails the region, what these
maps share in common is a perceived mismatch between current
frontiers and the reality of underlying social divisions that are ethnic,
tribal, and sectarian. In seeking to remedy this mismatch, the new
maps draw lines that are designed to better correspond to social
cleavages. For some commentators, new lines need to reflect both local
7
identities and prevailing geopolitical realities.11 For instance, in
describing the need for new states or "fully autonomous areas in Sunni
northern Iraq and eastern Syria," one analyst invokes first the realities
8
of Sunni revolt in the two countries.11 But by the same token, the
argument also requires recognizing that Russia would have to be made
a stakeholder in the new borders:

Procuring a Russian agreement to the creation of these two new entities would
not be easy; but there would be considerable prizes for Russia in such a deal. The

110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See id. ("Iraq has splintered into a Sunni north and west; a Kurdish northeast;
and a Shiite south that, with Iranian help, retains Baghdad; Syria is a patchwork, with
an Alawite-dominated corridor from Damascus to Latakia on the Mediterranean coast;
Druze and Kurdish minorities have mini-cantons, but much of the rest of the country is
held by fighters from the Sunni majority.").
113. See id.
114. Id.
115. See supra notes 4-15 and accompanying text.
116. See infra Sections III.A-C.
117. See Anatol Lieven, Opinion, The Key to Crushing ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/opinion/anatol-lieven-the-key-to-crushingisis.html [https://perma.cc/UL73-SZ3J] (archived Nov. 10, 2019).
118. Id.
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first would be that the existing Syrian state would be preserved over much of its
territory allowing the continued presence of Russian military bases and economic
ties . . . The second would be an American and NATO recognition of equal
partnership with Russia in solving this crisis. 1 1 9

The creation of new states in northern Iraq and eastern Syria is
described at once as the realpolitik recognition of facts on the ground
and as part of a new grand chessboard in which powerful external
actors-not the British and the French, but the United States, NATO,
and Russia-would have to strike a deal involving functional spheres
of influence in the new countries. More recently, American analysts
and officials have advocated the creation of "safe zones" in northern
Syria backstopped by an agreement between the United States,
Turkey, and Russia on a similar logic. 120
While many commentators have offered arguments that describe
the fracturing of existing states and then provide a normative rationale

for new borders, a smaller number have actually produced maps
corresponding to their vision and traced imagined cartographies of a
new Middle East. In what follows, this Article will describe three such
remappings before addressing the arguments that underpin the logic
of new borders. 12 1

119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Michael R. Gordon et al., Turkey Seeks U.S. Aid in Syria, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 5, 2019, at Al (noting that James Jeffrey, "the State Department envoy, is
seeking to forge an arrangement with the Turks that would allow them to enter northern
Syria, while avoiding largely Kurdish areas . . . Mr. Jeffrey and his State Department
team have created a color-coded map of northeastern Syria in an attempt to negotiate a
power-sharing plan ...
One former U.S. official described the map as 'Sykes-Picot on
acid,' a reference to the secret post-World War I deal between France and England that
carved up the Middle East into colonial spheres of influence.").
121. I omit several additional "new maps" due to space constraints. An early
example not considered in detail here was proposed in Vanity Fair in 2007 and discussed
briefly above. Incorporating insights provided by David Fromkin, Dennis Ross, Kenneth
Pollack and Daniel Byman, the magazine produced a "social and cultural" mapping of
the region to illustrate the variance between communal identities deemed salient and
the actual political boundaries in the region. The result identifies seventeen "nations of
the Middle East," including such imagined nations as "ArabiaFelix," (spanning parts of
Yemen and Saudi Arabia) and Tetrapolis (including parts of Syria and Jordan). See
Murphy & Hussein, supra note 40. Another remapping was offered by Syria scholar
Joshua Landis on Fareed Zakaria's CNN program, Global Public Square (or GPS).
Landis argued for a north-south partition of Syria. One state would be in north-eastern
Syria, largely land-locked with a possible port in the northwest corner of the country.
This would be a Sunni state to be supported by regional Sunni countries tasked with
ensuring the emergence of a non-ISIS form of rule. Southern Syria would remain
governed by the Alawite minority, though it would encompass Damascus and Druze
areas and would remain a multi-confessional state. Landis left indeterminate in his
account the fate of an "autonomous Kurdish region." Ultimately, he claimed that his new
map of Syria would be more stable because it would reflect the sectarian realities on the
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12 2

A. Ralph Peters's Blood Borders

In one of the earliest examples of a new mapping exercise, retired
United States Army lieutenant colonel Ralph Peters published a map
23
Peters
in the Armed Forces Journal that created quite a stir.1
explicitly argued in the article that "without such major boundary
24
revisions, we shall never see a more peaceful Middle East."1
The borders Peters drew were designed to "correct" for injustices

visited on communities with national identities that were not awarded
conventional
relatively
some
included
Corrections
states.125
recommendations, such as the creation of an independent Kurdistan,
though Peters's map produced a larger Kurdish country out of the
6
lands of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran than others might envision.12
Iraq was then further subdivided to produce a "Sunni Iraq" and an
"Arab Shia State" that would also gain territory from Saudi Arabia and

Iran.1 2 7

7, 2014),
(Nov.
CNN
Solution,
a
Syria
Landis on
See
ground.
http://www.cnn.com/videos/bestoftv/2014/ 11/08/exp-gps-landis-sot-syria.cnn
[https://perma.cc/VWR5-TPGP] (archived Nov. 10, 2019). For a discussion of a larger
collection of the new maps that proliferated among American and French analysts over
the last fifteen years, see Neep, supra note 13.
122. See Peters, supra note 26.
123. On the controversial reception of Peters' map, see Christopher Dickey, Don't
Redraw the MideastMap, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 4, 2006), https://www.newsweek.com/dickeydont-redraw-mideast-map-111485 [https://perma.cc/JQ2E-WN9P] (archived Dec. 31,
2019) (noting the experience of American reporters encountering the map in a mosque
in Baghdad and among Kurdish guerillas in northern Iraq). Dickey notes that "[a]t the
NATO Defense College in Rome last month, another American colonel reportedly
presented Peters' cartographic fantasy for discussion, only to have the Turkish officers
in the lecture walk out." Id.

124.
125.
126.
127.

Peters, supranote 26.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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for Western security, on his account, as much as it is for the region's
3

stability. 13
Peters, a regular commentator on Fox News until his abrupt
resignation from the network in 2018, is a retired United States Army
lieutenant colonel and intelligence expert who writes about United
134
His vision for "amending"
States strategy in the Middle East.
national boundaries tracks an idealized conception of the ethnic and
sectarian makeup of the underlying population in the different regions,
the kind of abstraction that would have been familiar to colonial
mapmakers. But this idealized conception of the region elides the fact
that the demographic concentrations on the basis of which the new
lines are drawn reflect, at most, the identity of a plurality of the
population in the regions he renders autonomous. Like most of the
Middle East, these territories are actually incredibly diverse, with
multiple ethnic and religious communities coexisting in different
proportions throughout and straddling across each of the new
borders. 1 35 To transform the existing underlying makeup of the region
into the relatively homogenous imagined new entities Peters conjures
would require a degree of violence and population transfer that is
rarely made explicit. Even after such violence, the new states would
likely still contain significant minority communities living within
borders designed for an ethno-sectarian majority, reproducing the very
risk of instability the new map was drawn to address.
1 36
B. Jeffrey Goldberg'sAfter Iraq

In describing his new mapping, Goldberg begins with the
observation (quoting David Fromkin) that "the modern map of the
Middle East . .. 'became what it is today both because the European

/

133. Id. Specifically, by arguing that "a portion of the bloodshed in the region will
continue to be our own" if borders are not redrawn, Peters explicitly linked the
imperative of new borders to the interest in ending American bloodshed in the region.
134. See Tom Namako, An Ashamed' Fox News Commentator Just Quit the
2018),
20,
(Mar.
NEWS
BUzzFEED
Machine',
'Propaganda
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/tomnamako/ralph-peters
[https://perma.cc/59UD-JH72] (archived Nov. 10, 2019).
135. For a discussion of the persistent heterogeneity of cities like Baghdad and
Basra in Iraq, see Sami Ramadani, The Sectarian Myth of Iraq, GUARDIAN (June 16,
2014), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/16/sectarian-myth-of-iraq
[https://perma.cc/6JR8-CHEQ] (archived Nov. 10, 2019).
(Jan.-Feb. 2008),
136. See generally Jeffrey Goldberg, After Iraq, ATLANTIC
3 6 5 77
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/01/after-iraq/ 0
[https://perma.ccUB4A-SLVY] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) [hereinafter Goldberg, After
Iraq]. Goldberg reprinted the map with additional comments on its boundaries in a
follow-up online article for the magazine seven years later. See Jeffrey Goldberg, The
2014),
19,
(June
ATLANTIC
East,
Middle
the
of
Map
New
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/the-new-map-of-the-middleeast/373080/ [https://perma.cc/R75R-TTXH] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) [hereinafter
Goldberg, The New Map of the Middle East].
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Similarly, Iran is reduced to its predominantly Persian territories,

ceding land to a "Greater Azerbaijan," and a newly created Arab
Khuzestan.14 2 Writing in 2008, Goldberg projects the tripartite
division of Iraq and argues that long-term instability in the region

could also result in the breakup of Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and
Pakistan.1 43 Such breakups, he notes, would likely make for a less

conflict-prone and more stable region once new borders were
established. 144 A substantial section of the article accompanying his
map describes Goldberg's interview with Peters about his earlier
map.1 45 The largely approving description of Peters's conception of "a

more logical Middle East" ends with Peters's perplexity at why
neoconservatives within the Bush administration had remained
committed to a unified Iraq rather than seeking a more ambitious

objective.1 4 6 In a follow-up article on his own map, written in 2014,
Goldberg observes: "When we were preparing the map that
accompanied the article, we erred on the side of whimsy and
exaggeration. However, in looking it over today, it doesn't seem
entirely fanciful."1 47 He goes on to note that in the intervening period,
Sudan had become two countries and that something like an "Alawite
48
Republic" has emerged out of the Assad-dominated parts of Syria.1
Strikingly, in 2014 Goldberg concludes his reflections on the "new
map" drawn in the pages of the Atlantic six years earlier by returning

to the question of Sykes-Picot:
I was very critical of the imperial hubris that motivated the Sykes-Picot division
of the Middle East by the British and French. But I've warmed to the argument
that the Sykes-Picot arrangement was, in one sense, inadvertently progressive.
The makers of the modern Middle East roped together peoples of different
ethnicities and faiths (or streams of the same faith) in what were meant to be
modern, multicultural, multi-confessional states. It is an understatement to say
that the Middle East isn't the sort of place where this kind of experiment has
been shown to work. 149

142. See Goldberg, After Iraq, supra note 136.
143. See id. In his article, Goldberg cites as an unintended consequence of the Iraq
war, "the likelihood that the Kurds will achieve their independence and that Iraq will go
the way of Gaul and be divided into three parts." Id.
144. See id.
145. See id. (The interview is described in a subsection of the essay titled "Mapping
the New Middle East.").
146. See id. ("Peters said he noticed early on as well that the administration was
committed to a unified Iraq, and to the preexisting, European-drawn map of the Middle
East. 'This is how strange things are-the greatest force for democracy in the world has
signed up for the maintenance of the European model of the world,' he said.").
147. Goldberg, The New Map of the Middle East, supra note 136.
148. See id. Interestingly, Goldberg does not acknowledge that his prediction that
the division of Sudan would end the violent conflict in those territories did not come to
pass.
149. Id.
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Thus, for Goldberg, one of the advantages of imagining a new map is
abandoning what he views as illusions of multicultural coexistence.

Instead, on his account, clear-eyed realists must embrace, at a
minimum, the partition of Iraq, while taking care to "forestall the

creation of permanent jihadist safe havens."1 50 As with Peters, the
price of Goldberg's recipe for a more stable region must necessarily
include population transfers and ethnic cleansing. While the prospect
of demographic engineering receives little attention in Goldberg's
analysis, the reminder to beware of unintended consequences involving
jihadists provides a reminder of the Western security concerns that
animate the new maps.

C. Robin Wright's Imagining a Remapped Middle East15 1
In 2013, Robin Wright introduced her proposed remapping by
observing that "the centrifugal forces of rival beliefs, tribes and
ethnicities-empowered by unintended consequences of the Arab
Spring-are pulling apart a region defined by European colonial
powers a century ago."1 52 Unlike the earlier maps, hers takes note of
the developments in the region following the Arab uprisings and,
importantly, the Libya intervention.1 53 In the end, her map focuses on
the fates of five countries: Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Libya.
While Iraq and Syria are divided into four states based on sectarian or
ethnic identity (Alawitistan, Shiitestan, Kurdistan, and Sunnistan),
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Libya are divided along geographical and
tribal identities for the most part.1 54 The resulting map produces
fourteen countries in place of the five that she begins with.15 5 Wright
treats what she is describing on her map as the medium-term outcome
of trajectories that have been set in motion through a combination of
the Arab uprisings and the Syrian civil war. 156
She argues that "[n]ew borders may be drawn in disparate, and
potentially chaotic, ways. Countries could unravel through phases of
federation, soft partition or autonomy, ending in geographic
divorce."157 That description tracks, perhaps intentionally, the

150. Id.
151. Robin Wright, Imagining a Remapped Middle East, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28,
2013), archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/opinion/sunday/imagining-aremapped-middle-east.html [https://perma.cc/WF69-FTA2] (archived Apr. 29, 2020).
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See id. ("The Arab Spring was the kindling. Arabs not only wanted to oust
dictators, they wanted power decentralized to reflect local identity or rights to resources.
Syria then set the match to itself and conventional wisdom about geography.").
157. Id.
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Of course, at some level Wright, like all of these mapmakers,

understands her own thought experiment to be equally as "faroff' as
the likelihood of good governance in the region. 1 63 But the shared

characteristic across all three maps is the fundamental belief that
stability in the region would require that ethnic, religious, and tribal

cleavages correspond directly to spatial divisions on a map and, by
extension, political sovereignties. What is troubling about these maps
is not the probability of their implementation. Rather, it is the intuition

that the pathologies of the region are grounded in the identities of its
diverse peoples rather than state institutions that might be amenable
to reform.
Remappings of the region's borders are generally presented as
thought experiments intended to reveal the sources of current
destabilization and the potential trajectory of apparently fracturing

states. There is one area where all of the new lines converge:
Kurdistan. Here, the maps are less flights of imagination and more
grounded exercises of realpolitik. For example, in discussing the
critical role of the Kurds as ground forces in the fight against ISIS,
,numerous commentators observe that an unintended consequence of
arming the Kurds has been facilitating ambitions for full independence
and the attendant risk of dismembering Iraq (and possible secession of
Rojava from Syria to a newly independent Kurdistan). 164 The 2017
Kurdish independence referendum is perhaps the only example of a
concrete development on the ground in the region that suggests an
appetite for new state formation. 165

163.
164.
break-up

See id.
See, e.g., Paddy Ashdown, Western intervention over Isis won't prevent the
of
Iraq,
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
14,
2015),

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/

2014/aug/14/western-intervention-isis-

iraq-muslim [https://perma.cc/P6HQ-24YV] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (arguing that the
US and the UK will "end up acting as handmaiden to Kurdish ambitions for full
independence"); Henri Barkey, The Meaning of Kobani, AM. INTEREST (Oct. 18, 2014),
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2014/10/18/the-meaning-of-kobani/
[https://perma.cc/F67X-866C] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (arguing that US aerial
bombardment of IS positions in Kobani secured a Kurdish victory that has consolidated
Kurdish nationhood); see generally DAVID L. PHILLIPS, KURDISH SPRING: A NEW MAP FOR
THE MIDDLE EAST (2015).

165. On September 25, 2017, an independence referendum was held in Iraqi
Kurdistan at the initiation of the Kurdish Democratic Party and its leader, thenpresident of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Masoud Barzani. 93% of votes
cast favored independence. Predictably, however, the Iraqi Constitutional Court
declared the vote unconstitutional. Within weeks, Baghdad marched troops into the oilrich city of Kirkuk, which had previously come under KRG control, occasioning
substantial loss of territory for Iraqi Kurdistan. Most observers believe that Barzani
campaigned for a referendum to shore up his own party against Iraqi Kurdish opposition
groups and to strengthen the KRG's hand in negotiations with Baghdad for greater
autonomy within existing borders. If so, the gamble backfired badly, weakening the
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The Kurdish case in some ways exemplifies the mapmakers'
dilemma. On the one hand, Sykes-Picot and the subsequent
agreements between European powers, Turkish leaders, and various
Arab representatives all reflected a profound disregard for the Kurdish
community's longstanding territorial claims. The toponym "Kurdistan"
has as much historical significance as "Irak Arabi" or any of the other
1 66
An area that enjoyed a
regional designations on the Ottoman map.
large measure of autonomy under the Ottomans until the modernizing
and centralizing reforms of the nineteenth century, Kurdistan was
inhabited by a population that shared a language and cultural identity
167
With the fall of
that was recognized as distinctive under the empire.
the Ottomans, the Kurds sought autonomy arrangements either
through an alliance with the successor state to the Ottomans-which
they hoped would enable the restoration of their autonomy through a
168
form of decentralized rule-or through an independent state.
Neither of these came to pass as Kurdish lands were divided three
ways between the British and French mandates and the new Turkish
state. 169 Moreover, the British and French negotiated the future of
their mandates primarily with local Arab leaders, reflecting their
conception of the post-Ottoman Middle East as an essentially Arab
170
On the other
region without equal regard for other communities.
hand, the Kurdish case reflects the acutely destabilizing potential of
any attempt to redraw borders, however deep their historical
antecedents. The Kurdish communities now enclosed within the postOttoman territorial boundaries of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq have each

KRG's position and shrinking its territory. The referendum demonstrated both that the
overwhelming majority of Kurds in Iraq support independence in principle, and that the
constraints of the regional context have led them, for the most part, to seek more
meaningful autonomy within Iraq rather than actual secession. For my analysis of the
referendum, see Ash Bali, Independence Referenda Through the Prism of Kurdistan,
27,
2017),
BLOG
(Dec.
L.
J.
CONST.
INT'L
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/12/independence-referenda-through-the-prism-ofkurdistan-i-connect-column/ [https://perma.cc/5HP7-2RKC] (archived Nov. 10, 2019).
166. MCDOWALL, supra note 104, at 6 (noting that the term "Kurdistan" was first
used as a geographical term by the Seljuk dynasty in the twelfth century).
167. See id. at 1-87 (history of Kurdish identity and social formation as well as its
status under the Ottomans).
168. As discussed briefly above, Kurdish forces joined the Anatolian military
campaign as part of the National Pact (or misak-i milli) in a bid to maintain the
territorial integrity of Ottoman Kurdish lands. Id. at 124-47 (noting that to keep
Kurdish forces on side, the Turks promised to "support a policy ... of decentralized local
government by the subject races" in their new state. The Kurdish struggle to free the
province of Mosul of western occupation as part of the National Pact campaign was
eventually betrayed by Turkish leaders who signed the Lausanne Treaty, setting borders
that left Mosul under the British mandate. With Turkey's borders set after Lausanne,
Ottoman Kurdish territories were left divided.).
169. Id. at 115-50 (Chapter 7: "Redrawing the Map: The Partition of Ottoman
Kurdistan").
170. ROGAN, supra note 1, at 390-406 (describing the post-war view of the nonTurkish Ottoman territories as "Arab lands" by European powers).
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pursued autonomy within those borders in a variety of ways. The
Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq has attained the highest
degree of independence under a federal arrangement in place since
2005, while the Kurdish community of northeastern Syria has more
recently declared itself an autonomous region in the course of that
country's civil war. 171 The Kurdish community in Turkey has, at
different times, pursued autonomy through an armed insurgency and
through a political process of decentralization. 17 2 Yet whenever the
pursuit of autonomy has drawn existing borders into question, the
result has been armed conflict-producing horrific, largely Kurdish,
casualties-and the preservation of existing borders, often with
international support.1 73

Beyond Kurdistan, the new maps are far more disconnected from
events on the ground, serving instead as projections of future
geographies based in the current demographic makeup of the region.
The fantastical nature of the maps is conceded by these cartographers
who recognize, at times with regret, that current world powers have
evinced no desire to see borders rearranged. Even in the Kurdish case;

171. See generally Michael J. Kelly, The Kurdish Regional Constitution within the
Framework of the Iraqi Federal Constitution: A Struggle for Sovereignty, Oil, Ethnic
Identity and the Prospects for a Reverse Supremacy Clause, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 707
(2010) (discussing the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq and its constitutional
status); Si Sheppard, What the Syrian Kurds Have Wrought, ATLANTIc (Oct. 25, 2016)
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/10fkurds-rojava-syria-isis-iraqassad/505037/ [https://perma.cc/S87P-LBVA] (archived Nov. 10, 2019); Syrian Kurds
declare new federation in bid for recognition, MIDDLE E. EYE (Mar. 17, 2016),
https://www. middleeasteye.net/news/syrian-kurds-declare-new-federation-bidrecognition [https://perma.cc/H83W-GCXP] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (discussing the
autonomy of the Kurdish Syrian region of Rojava).
172. See generally Michael M. Gunter, The Turkish-Kurdish Peace Process, 14
GEO. J. INT'L AFF. 101 (2013) (a concise discussion of these efforts).
173. Casualties of the armed conflict between the Turkish military and the
Kurdish insurgency are estimated to be over 40,000. See Berkay Mandiraci, Turkey's
PKK Conflict: The Death Toll,
INT'L CRISIS GROUP (July 20, 2016),
https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/westerneuropemediterranean/turkey/turkey-s-pkk-conflict-death-toll
[https://perma.cc/F7X2Y6AS] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (describing various casualty estimates ranging from
30,000 to 45,000 for the period from 1984 to the 2010s); see also Tal Axelrod, Syrian
DemocraticForcesofficial warns of 'humanitariancatastrophe'aheadof expected Turkish
operation, THE HILL (Oct. 8, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/international/middle-eastnorth-africa/464950-syrian-democratic-forces-official-warns-of [https://perma.cc/54BWUF48] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (the Syrian Kurdish enclave of Rojava is embattled on
all sides, facing the real prospect of a Turkish onslaught as well as the risk of repression
from Damascus); Loveday Morris, How the Kurdish independence referendum backfired
spectacularly,WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/howthe-kurdish-independence-referendum-backfired-/2017/10/20/3010c820-b371- 11e79b93-b97043e57a22_story.html [https://perma.cc/4ZJB-KYCK] (archived Nov. 10, 2019)
(noting the independence referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan in 2017 resulted in the Iraqi
army engaging in a military action against the Kurdistan Regional Government leading
the latter to lose control of the major city of Kirkuk).
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the United States and other major world powers formally oppose the
74
The
creation of an independent Kurdistan with new borders.1
emergence of de facto autonomous enclaves in Iraqi Kurdistan or

Syrian Rojava have not been discouraged, but the proposition of
translating these developments into de jure border shifts enjoys
1 75
Kurdish communities
neither regional nor international support.
appreciate the challenges of seeking independence when each of the
countries in which a majority of Kurds reside treats secession as a
casus belli.17 6 As a result, Kurdish leaders in each of these states have
pursued a range of strategies to gain a greater measure of
77
Indeed, there may be
independence from within existing borders.1

174. Mohammad Zargham, U.S. 'strongly opposes' Iraqi Kurdish independence
vote: State Department, REUTERS, Sept. 20, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/usmideast-crisis-kurds-usa/u-s-strongly-opposes-iraqi-kurdish-independence-vote-statedepartment-idUSKCN1BV32I [https://perma.cc/LP9F-8T89] (archived Nov. 10, 2019);
UK opposed referendum on independence of Iraqi Kurdistan, FRONT NEWS INT'L (Sept.
http://frontnews.eu/news/en/13436/UK-opposed-referendum-on2017),
17,
independence-of-Iraqi-Kurdistan [https://perma.cc/GN86-VYW3] (archived Nov. 10,
2019).
175. There is certainly indigenous Kurdish support for an autonomous Kurdistan.
While sometimes expressed in secessionist terms, however, the Kurdish community has
been an especially creative source of alternative arrangements-short of shifting
borders-for realizing autonomy without territorial independence. In particular, there
have been many experiments among the Kurdish communities of Syria, Iraq and Turkey
with federal or decentralized arrangements. See, e.g., Anne Barnard, Syrian Kurds Hope
to Establish a Federal Region in Country's North, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/world/middleeast/syria-kurds.html
[https://perma.cc/3APL-DDYQ] (archived Nov. 10, 2019); Viola Gienger, Iraqi Unity Will
Require Federalism, Cooperation,Kurdish Leaders Say, U.S. INST. FOR PEACE (Sept. 19,
https://www.usip.org/publications/2014/09/iraqi-unity-will-require-federalism2014),
cooperation-kurdish-leaders-say [https://perma.cc/Q6SD-FY4V] (archived Nov. 10, 2019)
(citing comments by the chief of staff to Masoud Barzani, president of the Iraq's
Kurdistan region, and the regional government's minister of foreign relations); PKK
leaderreiteratesKurdish confederation a 'statelesssolution', HURRIYET DAILY NEWS (Apr.
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/pkk-leader-reiterates-kurdish2013),
8,
9
(archived
[https://perma.cc/UU4K-3RT5]
confederation-as-stateless-solution--4447
Nov. 10, 2019).
176. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 173 (noting that "Turkey, Iran and Syria were
deeply concerned that the [independence referendum] vote [in Iraqi Kurdistan] would
fan secessionist sentiment among their own Kurdish populations. Along with Baghdad,
they have the power to completely besiege the landlocked region economically."). But if
conditions in Iraq produced de facto independence for Kurdistan, the other regional
powers might adapt to that scenario, so long as they could secure their own territories
against secession. For a discussion of possible scenarios for Kurdish independence and
threat perceptions in the region, see generally ALIREZA NADER, LARRY HANAUER, BRENNA
ALLEN, & ALI G. SCOTTEN, REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF AN INDEPENDENT KURDISTAN 5

(2016).
177. See, e.g., Joost Jongerden, Governing Kurdistan: Self-Administration in the
Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq and the Democratic Federation of Northern
Syria, 18 ETHNOPOLITICS 61 (2018) (discussing the non-state governmental system
created by the Syrian Kurdish community); Guney Yildiz, Kurdistan:A State or a State
of Mind?, CAIRO REv. (2019), https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/kurdistan-a-stateor-a-state-of-mind/ [https:/perma.cc/AG3C-BDML] (archived Nov. 10, 2019); Michiel
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few communities in the world where average citizens have a greater
appreciation for theories of devolution and decentralization than the
Kurds of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq.1 7 8 Decentralization is, no doubt,

understood as a second-best means of achieving autonomy for Kurdish
communities that wish to reunify territory divided across three postOttoman states, but their current political projects reflect the view that
even a second-best option remains preferable to war.
If the new maps are intended as thought experiments concerning
what might have been or what might yet come rather than real world

policy proposals, it is tempting to dismiss their significance. Yet, the
importance of these maps lies in what they reveal about prevailing
arguments and preferences in American and international policy

circles. The maps are a guide to what these analysts view as the best
means to resolve the conflicts currently raging in the Arab world and
produce a more stable basis for regional order. Given the outsized role

that the United States has played in the fate of Iraq over the last
quarter century, 179 and the impact the 2003 war in Iraq has had on
setting in motion the destabilization of the region,1 80 American policy

debates about the implications of the resulting sectarian conflicts
matter. The equation of identity with geography has potentially farreaching consequences if it settles into conventional wisdom. When
each new development in the ongoing Iraqi transition occasions hand
wringing about the viability of existing borders, the idea of altering

borders risks being normalized.1 81 Although the United States may be
seeking to reduce its profile in the Middle East,1 82 it remains one of the

Leezenberg, The ambiguities of democratic autonomy: the Kurdish movement in Turkey
and Rojava, 16 J. SE. EUR. & BLACK SEA STUD. 671 (2016) (discussing theories of
autonomy through democratic decentralization developed by Kurdish political actors as
a means of realizing autonomy within existing borders in Syria and Turkey).
178. See, e.g., Jongerden, supra note 177; Leezenberg, supra note 177, at 671-90;
Sheppard, supra note 171.
179. For a summary of the more than twenty-five years of U.S. intervention in
Iraq, see Emma Sky, Reflecting on 25 Years of US Policy Towards, Iraq, JUST SEC. (Jan.
26,
2016),
https://www.justsecurity.org/28974/reflecting-25-years-policy-iraq/
[https://perma.cc/AF6Z-TPEE] (archived Nov. 10, 2019).
180. For an assessment of the destabilizing consequences of the Iraq war prepared
for the U.S. Air Force by the RAND Corporation, see, e.g., FREDERIC WEHREY ET. AL., THE
IRAQ EFFECT: THE MIDDLE EAST AFTER THE IRAQ WAR (RAND Project Air Force, 2010),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RANDMG892.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y7U3-YWQQ] (archived Nov. 10, 2019).
181. See, e.g., Tim Arango, With Iraq Mired in Turmoil, Some Call for Partitioning
the Country, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/29/world/
middleeast/with-iraq-mired-in-turmoil-some-call-for-partitioning-the-country.html
[https://perma.cc/MJ26-U9R3] (archived Nov. 10, 2019).
182. See, e.g., Marc Lynch, Obama and the Middle East: Rightsizing the U.S. Role,
FOREIGN AFF. (Sept. 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.comlarticles/middle-east/obamaand-middle-east [https://perma.cc/66TK-D54F]
(archived Nov. 10, 2019); Eileen
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most powerful external interveners in the region from Yemen to Libya
83
The commentary that informs American
to Syria and Iraq.1
policymakers' judgments about the relative merits of partitions or the
normative desirability of ratifying the effects of ethno-sectarian

cleansing are of some consequence.

IV.

DERIVING CARTOGRAPHY FROM DEMOGRAPHY

Jeffrey Goldberg's remarks in 2014 on the remapping he had
envisioned seven years earlier provide an explicit link between latterday cartography and critiques of Sykes-Picot. In contemplating where
earlier mapmaking had gone wrong, Goldberg argues that Sykes-Picot
had been "too progressive" for the Middle East, which just "isn't the
sort of place" where "modern multicultural and multiconfessional

states" can be established.1 84 The states produced by the Sykes-Picot

85
They were the
maps were not merely artificial, by his account.1
products of a modern sensibility transcending ethnicity and sect to
produce political communities made up of a cross section of the
186
But such modern
underlying communal identities of the region.
states were not sustainable, he suggests, in a region where loyalties
87
remained tribal, ethnic, and religious.1 On this argument, the peoples
brought together by European lines on the map were never able to
cohere into communities that would serve as loyal citizens of their new

states. To echo a scholar of uti possidetis writing in another context,
preserving such borders might amount to a kind of "cosmopolitan
88
Implicit in
diktat," forcing diverse peoples to live together.1
Goldberg's observations are three interrelated arguments that are
common to the imagined cartographies described in the earlier section
and to the many other "remappings" of the Middle East that have
proliferated in the last decade. First, the states produced by European
agreements in the post-Ottoman Arab world were artificial. Second,

these artificial states were inherently unstable because of the
Sullivan, Defending Syria Withdrawal, Trump Says U.S. Should Not Be 'Policeman of
2018),
20,
(Dec.
TIMES
N.Y.
East',
Middle
the
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/20/us/politics/trump-syria-withdrawal.html
[https://perma.cc/959J-AAL9] (archived Mar. 19, 2020).
183. For an overview of US military involvement in these countries, see Anthony
Cordesman, U.S. Wars in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen: What Are the Endstates?, CTR.
FOR STRATEGIC INT'L STUD. (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-wars-iraq-

(archived
[https://perma.cc/GQL4-AW2F]
syria-libya-and-yemen-what-are-endstates
Nov. 10, 2019).
184. Goldberg, The New Map of the Middle East, supra note 136.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Stephen R. Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetisand the Borders of
New States, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 590, 617 (1996).
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combustible combination of ethnic and sectarian identities they
internalized. And third, better, more stable borders were possible a
century ago and may yet emerge out of the conflicts that now
characterize the region.

A. Artificial "Quasi-States"
The political scientist Robert Jackson coined the phrase "quasistates" to signify states that were accorded juridical sovereignty
through decolonization without having the attributes of positive
sovereignty-notably the ability to protect borders, foster human
rights, promote socioeconomic welfare, and provide citizens with
political goods.1 89 More recently, Greg Gause, an expert in the

comparative politics of the Middle East, has suggested that the Arab
world is increasingly made up of quasi-states.19 0 Jackson argued that
reifying colonial borders produced an unjust distribution of sovereign
rights to arbitrary (artificial) units, rather than communities that

already enjoyed a common identity.191 Like Goldberg, then, Jackson
takes the view that nonhomogenous, multiethnic, and tribal territories

would not lend themselves to becoming successful states capable of
exercising positive sovereignty.1 9 2 Further, he noted that in the course
of decolonization liberation for some produced enclosures for others.193
The insight here is that colonial divisions dissected the land of cohesive
communities into multiple states, leaving such communities as
minorities to be dominated by the principal ethno-sectarian group. The
denial of self-determination to peoples whose identity did not
correspond to colonial lines was a recipe for persecution on Jackson's
telling.1 94 This latter insight echoes Woodrow Wilson's approach to
self-determination,1 9 5 returning us to the debates of the post-World

189. JAcKSON, supra note 39, at 21.
190. See Gause III, supra note 39 (citing JAcKSON, supra note 39).
191. See JAcKSON, supranote 39, at 40-47 (describing decolonization as conferring
statehood to territories "which usually contain different peoples but are not peoples
themselves" thus uniting disparate communities within a single territorial
configuration).
192. See id. at 149-51 (arguing that these states "were often dominated by
particular ethnic groups with the frequent result of inflaming rather than dampening
the built-in conflicts of divided societies.").
193. See id. at 41-42 (discussing the plight of Baluchis, Kurds, Sikhs and Tamils,
among others).
194. See id. at 151-54 (noting that turning ex-colonial borders into the basis for
independence has left ethnonational minorities under statesmen who are "abusive and
coercive in their domestic conduct which not infrequently is provocative of internal
disorder and violence").
195.

See generally ADOM GETACHEW, WORLDMAKING AFTER EMPIRE: THE RISE AND

FALL OF SELF-DETERMINATION (2019). Getachew argues that Wilson's conception of self-
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War I period over whether the Kurds, as the most obvious example,
ought to have been accorded their own state.
Despite the prevailing narratives about Sykes-Picot, however,

historical evidence of the artificiality of the postwar Arab state system
is thin.196 As several historians of Iraq have shown, for instance, the

197
The
origins of the Iraq-as-artificial-state thesis are colonial.
argument did not emerge as an indigenous critique of new boundaries

but as a British assertion that "Iraq was not yet coherent enough to
98
govern itself, contrary to the claims of Iraqi nationalists."1 In other
words, the putative artificiality of Iraq was invoked to justify the
99
Further, the artificiality
colonial administration of the territory.1

thesis served to obscure the history of the 1920 Iraqi revolt, a
nationalist resistance movement pursuing independence within the
2 00
The adoption of the banner of an
post-Ottoman boundaries of Iraq.
replaced with a narrative that
was
inhabitants
its
by
Iraq
independent
Iraq was an ungovernable territory in need of tutelage to create a

determination that would map demographically defined communities onto new borders
lies at the heart of the conflation of demography and cartography. Id. This way of
defining self-determination had the effect of precluding other political imaginaries for a
post-colonial order from taking shape. Id. A recent exploration of the forms of subaltern
cosmopolitanism that proposed alternative visions to a post-colonial order of nationstates vividly demonstrates the radical potential for regional solidarities that went
largely unrealized as a consequence of the narrow definition of self-determination. Id.
Kurdish conceptions of nationalism that sat alongside a vision of themselves as members
of a multi-national Ottoman state-and possible members of an alliance with a postOttoman Turkish state-are one example of such a foreclosed alternative model of selfdetermination. Id. See generally Janet Klein, Kurdish Nationalistsand Non-Nationalist
Kurdists: Rethinking Minority Nationalism and the Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire,
1908-1909, 13 NATIONS & NATIONALISM 135 (2007) (discussing the multiplicity of
conceptions of Kurdish nationalism in the early twentieth century).
196. Even as an equally strong historical case existed in the early twentieth
century for an independent Kurdistan within boundaries that also would not have been
arbitrary or artificial.
197. See generally TRIPP, supra note 94. Tripp establishes that the lands of
Mesopotamia had been designated al-'Iraqsince the eighth century by Arab geographers,
were incorporated as an administrative unit in the Ottoman empire during the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, and were governed for administrative, taxation and military
purposes together under the Ottoman imperial order. Id. He also argues that the
common effects of nineteenth century Ottoman reforms, particularly in the area of land,
further integrated the three provinces into a cohesive unit with a multiethnic, multiconfessional population. Id.; REIDAR VISSER & GARETH STANSFIELD, IRAQ OF ITS REGIONS

(2007) (bringing together historians assessing regionalism and federalism in Iraq while
acknowledging the development of Iraqi identity prior to and under Ottoman rule).
198. Pursley, supra note 13.
199. The contrast with the African experience, where indigenous populations
explicitly marked postcolonial borders as artificial, is striking. On the contrasting
African experience, see Makau W. Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and
Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1113, 1115 (1995).
200. See TRIPP, supra note 94, at 36-45 (discussing the 1920 Iraqi revolt); see also
PURSLEY, supra note 98, at 37-41.
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cohesive nation. 20 1 The artificiality argument was later invoked for
similar purposes in the aftermath of the 1991 and 2003 wars against
Iraq. 2 02 The imposition of a no-fly zone over northern Iraq in 1991
resulted in the soft partition of Kurdistan from the rest of Iraq. 20 3
Following the 2003 Iraq War, more ambitious plans of federation or
formal partition were contemplated in then-Senator Joe Biden's 2006
proposal for a trifurcation of Iraq. 204

As discussed above, European powers set the post-Ottoman
boundaries of Iraq through a process largely controlled by the British
and the French but impacted by local actors and national resistance
movements.20 5 The claim that these processes produced artificial
borders is inconsistent with the historical record. Ottoman maps from
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries clearly designated the three

administrative provinces of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul together as al'Iraq al-'Arabi.206 Indeed, the Sykes-Picot map itself shows the
transliterated Ottoman administrative designations including the
phrase "IrakArabi" over the territory of these three provinces. 20 7 Far
from being artificial, the geographical nomenclature adopted by the
mandate powers was simply a continuation of the Ottoman
designations, themselves adaptations from earlier Arab dynasties
dating back to the eighth century.2 0 8 Sykes-Picot produced lines

201. See Pursley, supra note 13, at part 1 (noting that the idea of Iraq as an
"artificial state" was a response to the 1920 revolt, "a colonial narrative, invoked to argue
that Iraq was not yet coherent enough to govern itself, contrary to the claims of Iraqi
nationalists").
202. See, e.g., Martha Stutchbury, The Artificial Constructionof Iraq, RETROSPECT
JOURNAL (Jan. 28, 2019), https://retrospectjournal.com/2019/01/28/the-artificialconstruction-of-iraq/ [https://perma.c/VQA8-BZMD] (archived Mar. 4, 2020) (arguing
that the "dysfunctional composition" of the state is related to "increased levels of the
divided sectarianism that first presented itself in 1921, and remains a dominant feature
of Iraqi politics today"). For examples of more political invocations of Iraq's allegedly
"artificial borders" to make latter-day arguments concerning its political trajectory, see
Arango, supra note 181; see also Ali Khedery, Iraq in Pieces: Breaking Up to Stay
Together,
FOREIGN
AFF.
MAG.
(Nov.-Dec.
2015),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2015-09-22/iraq-pieces
[https://perma.cc/N4NH-RN9Y] (archived Mar. 4, 2020).
203. See Michael M. Gunter, A de facto Kurdish State in Northern Iraq, 14 THIRD
WORLD Q. 295, 295 (1993) (discussing the de facto autonomy accorded the Kurds
following the 1991 Gulf War and the imposition of a no-fly zone).
204. See Joseph R. Biden Jr. & Leslie H. Gelb, Unity Through Autonomy in Iraq,
N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/01/opinion/Olbiden.html
[https://perma.cc/6XPV-327D] (archived Nov. 10, 2019).
205. See id.
206. See BERDINE, supra note 54, at 106 (2018).
207. See Ruthven, supra note 7 (emphasis added) (reproducing the images
distributed by ISIS).
208. See TRIPP, supra note 94, at 8 (noting that "the term al-'Iraq (meaning the
shore of a great river along its length, as well as the grazing land surrounding it) had
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grafted onto an Ottoman map and subsequent British rule retained
much of the Ottoman administrative structure, grounding the postindependence territorial iterations of Iraq in Ottoman historical
antecedents. 209 Iraqi nationalists resisting British rule were
demanding independence within borders that largely coincided not
only with the contours of mandate Iraq but with their own sense of
2
their political geography. 10
A similar history may be provided for post-Ottoman Syria, the

borders of which were set around the provinces of Aleppo and
Damascus. The Ottoman designation "greater Syria" encompassed a
much larger territory, stretching across most of the Levant from
Aleppo to Gaza, including contemporary Lebanon, Palestine, and
Jordan. 21 1 From this wider area, the French had already come to terms
with the Ottomans in the nineteenth century to carve out a separate
governance arrangement for Mount Lebanon to protect Christian
communities. 2 1 2 Under the mandate, the French transformed this
earlier Ottoman administrative boundary into state borders for an
2 13
The more controversial line-drawing
independent Lebanon.

exercises were those that carved Jordan and Palestine out of greater
Syria. In 1919, the American King-Crane Commission traveled across
Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria, interviewing and polling local elites and
214
Their findings established
receiving petitions along the way.
widespread support across the post-Ottoman Levant for a united and

been used since at least the eighth century by Arab geographers to refer to the great
alluvial plain of the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers").
209. See id. at 45 (noting that the institutional definition of the Iraqi state under
the British demonstrated that "the old Sunni-dominated order of Ottoman times was
being re-established").
210. See id. at 37. Tripp cites a survey by the British concerning the preferences of
notables in the three provinces in 1919, which revealed "agreement, outside of the
Kurdish areas, that the state should comprise all three of the Ottoman provinces under
an Arab government." Id. He suggests that once Iraq gained independence, some of the
Kurdish community developed a conception of Iraq as a nation of Arabs and Kurds. Id.
This included adopting a "progressive nationalist agenda" of pursuing autonomy for
Kurdistan within the borders of a democratic Iraq. Id.; see also Inga Rogg & Hans
Rimscha, The Kurds as Parties to and Victims of Conflicts in Iraq, 89 INT'L REV. RED
CROSS 823, 826 (2007) (discussing the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq, and its slogan
"Autonomy for Kurdistan, Democracy for Iraq").
211. CLEVELAND & BUNTON, supra note 58, at 211.
212.

See STANFORD J. SHAW & EZEL KURAL SHAW, REFORM, REVOLUTION, AND

REPUBLIC: THE RISE OF MODERN TURKEY, 1808-1975, at 142-44 (1977) (explaining that
the"Reglement Organique," negotiated from 1860-64 created the Mount Lebanon
Mutasarrifate, and the terms of this agreement granted Lebanon a semi-autonomous
status that separated it from the remainder of greater Syria half a century before World
War 1).
213. See ROGAN, supra note 1, at 405.
214. See id. at 401.
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independent greater Syria. 215 There was little to no local support for
according independence to smaller units based on communal
identities. 216
The separation of Palestine from the rest of Syria became
irreversible as a consequence of British commitments in the Balfour
Declaration. 217 The later decision finalized at the 1921 Cairo
Conference to further carve Transjordan out of the Palestine mandate
was without precedent. 2 18 The territory designated "Transjordan" by
the British had been "a southerly extension of the province of Syria," 219
with no prior existence as a defined territory for Ottoman
administrative purposes. This was perhaps the only example of a
wholly "artificial" state produced under the Anglo-French mandates.
The purpose of these new borders was to weaken continuing nationalist
resistance to French rule in Syria. 2 2 0 By installing a Hashemite ruler
in Jordan, the British diverted Arabian military and political support

215. See The King-Crane Commission Report, WIKIPEDIA (Aug. 28, 1919),
http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/TheKing-CraneReport
[https://perma.cc/X4MNRFUJ] (archived Nov. 12, 2019) [hereinafter King-CraneReport]; see also Nick Danforth,
The Middle East That Might Have Been, ATLANTIC
(Feb.
13, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/02/the-middle-east-that-mighthave-been/385410/ [https://perma.cc/NS6J-EWUQ] (archived Nov. 12, 2019) (describing
the King-Crane Commission and its findings, noting that "the commissioners traveled
from city to city accepting petitions and taking testimony, compiling a rare record of Arab
popular opinion ... Some 80 percent of those interviewed favored the establishment of a
'United Syria."').
216. See King-Crane Commission Report, supra note 215. The Commission
reported a rate of 10.9% support for an independent Lebanon and 0.32% support for a
separate Palestinian territory carved out of greater Syria. Id. Again, here, it is worth
noting that the Kurdish community was distinctive in its desire to see Aleppo remain
united with other Ottoman Kurdish territories in line with the misak-i milli (National
Pact) understanding of the Turkish independence struggle. Id.; see also MICHAEL
PROVENCE, THE LAST OTTOMAN GENERATION AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN MIDDLE

EAST 149-51 (2017) (discussing the bitterness provoked by Turkish agreement to borders
in Lausanne that were limited to Anatolia); Irfan Aktan, Mehmet Bayrak: Afrin'e
KurtdaglilarinMutalebati'ndan bakalim [Let's Consider Afrin from the Perspective of
its Earlier Kurdish Inhabitants' Demands], GAZETE DUVAR (Feb. 2, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/C7ES-7HJE] (archived Nov. 1, 2019) (discussing the Kurdish sense of
betrayal over the loss of Aleppo and quoting a well-respected historian of Kurdistan on
the demands of Syrian Kurds in Afrin a century earlier, accusing Mustafa Kemal of
betraying the National Pact by allowing their lands to be divided from the rest of the
Ottoman Kurdistan territories).
217. See ROGAN, supra note 1, at 401-02 (discussing the catalysts of the end of the
Ottoman empire and the various stages of change in the Middle East).
218. See FROMKIN, supra note 2, at 503-06.
219.

M.E. YAPP, THE NEAR EAST SINCE THE FIRST WORLD WAR 140 (1996).

220. See id. at 139-42 (explaining that by offering to install Abdullah, Sharif
Hussein's son, as king of the newly separated Transjordan, the British were
compensating for their failure to honor the terms of the Hussein-McMahon
correspondence concerning Syria and the subsequent overthrow of Faisal by the French).
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221
While it is difficult to
for the independence movement in Syria.
imagine a more arbitrary exercise in line-drawing, champions of the
"artificial state" thesis have not turned their sights on Jordan. To the
contrary, all of the new mappings of the Middle East retain the
2 22
That few question the longJordanian state or expand its territories.
term stability of Jordan, even as they attribute instability elsewhere
in the region to artificial borders, is a telling inconsistency.
As for the rest of post-Ottoman Syria, the demands of local
nationalists in the 1920s were for a united and independent Syria,
encompassing as much of the territory of Ottoman greater Syria as
possible. 22 3 Local Arab elites who rejected the creation of smaller
communal statelets continued to identify with the Ottoman
224
Some scholars argue that the very
configuration of Syria.
nationalism of the population of greater Syria led the French to adopt
225
On this account, the French decision to
a divide and rule strategy.
administratively divide Syria was designed to limit territory-wide
2 26
In addition to the
political mobilizations of Syrian nationalists.
carving out of an autonomous Lebanon, four other autonomous
227
Two of these reflected the principal Ottoman
statelets were created.
provinces of Damascus and Aleppo. The other two were carved out as
228
In the end,
enclaves for the Alawite and Druze communities.
however, these particular artificial lines did not survive the end of
229
The historical continuities that defined Syria
French indirect rule.
and Iraq as geographic designations under the Ottomans (and before)
survived the Anglo-French carve up of the region. The historical record
shows that the states of Syria and Iraq were understood by a majority
of their inhabitants as corresponding to preexisting and meaningful
identities, even if the precise boundaries between them had shifted as
2 30
a result of colonial cartography.
The trouble with the artificiality thesis, then, is twofold. First, the
states that are deemed most precarious in the post-Ottoman region
today-Syria and Iraq-have historical antecedents that long predate

221. See MARIAN KENT, MOGULS AND MANDARINS: OIL, IMPERIALISM AND THE
MIDDLE EAST IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY, 1900-1940 25 (1993).

222. See, e.g., Goldberg, After Iraq, supra note 136; Peters, supra note 26; Wright,
supra note 151.
223.

See CLEVELAND & BUNTON, supra note 58, at 210.

224. See id.
225. See Fildis, supra note 90, at 134.
226. See NEEP, supra note 91, at 31.
227. See id.
228. See CLEVELAND & BUNTON, supra note 58, at 208-09.
229. See id. at 30.
230. See Derek Davison, Sykes-Picot Still Confounds, A'TwIw (Nov. 14, 2014),
https://attwiw.com/2014/11/14/getting-sykes-picot-sort-of-right-but-also-kind-of-wrong/
[https://perma.cc/Y2D4-DPEN] (archived Nov. 15, 2019) (providing that, as one
commentator has argued, "whatever the provenance or desirability of the current SyriaIraq border might be, there's no question that 'Syria' and 'Iraq' have been distinct
political, cultural, and later national entities for at least a couple of millennia now").
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Sykes-Picot and other Anglo-French agreements that partially defined
their modern borders. Moreover, these geographic designations were
sources of identity for the populations living on the territories, as is
made plain by the history of nationalist mobilizations they engendered

beginning in the 1920s. 23 1 The example of Jordan also suggests that
the absence of historical antecedents or the arbitrary setting of
boundaries is not actually dispositive, from the perspective of modern
mapmakers, of the legitimacy or stability of states and borders.
B. Imagined Communities
The "artificial state" thesis is not well supported by the historical
record of Syria and Iraq. But there may be another sense in which the
new cartographers discern artificiality in these particular Arab states.
Perhaps what is "artificial" is not the presence or absence of historical
antecedents but the fact that the boundaries of Syria and Iraq joined
disparate ethnic and religious communities into a single polity. In this
sense, it might be argued, the relative homogeneity of the communities
that were assembled in newly designated Jordan made for a more
sustainable state than the multiethnic, multiconfessional, and diverse
tribal communities inhabiting Iraqi and Syrian territories. Setting
aside for the moment the identity-based divisions that characterize

Jordan, 232 is the artificiality thesis more plausible as a matter of
demography rather than geography?
Using underlying demographic divisions such as ethnicity, sect, or

tribe as the basis for geographic designations is a foreign approach to
state building in a region characterized by millennia of multiethnic,

231. Of course, it should be noted that while the geographic designations of Iraq
and Syria were not artificial, nor were they the only or inevitable territorial designations
that might have been accorded significance in establishing a post-Ottoman division of
the region. As we have seen, historical antecedents and a communal sense of national
identification were also present in Ottoman Kurdistan. See generally HAKAN OZOdLU,
KURDISH NOTABLES AND THE OTTOMAN STATE: EVOLVING IDENTITIES, COMPETING

LOYALTIES, AND SHIFTING BOUNDARIES (2004) (discussing the evolution of Kurdish
nationalism); KAMAL SOLEIMANI, ISLAM AND COMPETING NATIONALISMS IN THE MIDDLE

EAST 1876-1926 (2016) (discussing the evolution of Kurdish nationalism); Sabri Ate§, In
the Name of the Caliph and the Nation: The Sheikh Ubeidullah Rebellion of 1880-81, 47
IRANIAN STUD. 735 (2014) (discussing the evolution of Kurdish nationalism).
232. See A Kingdom of Two Halves, EcONOMIST (May 13, 2014),
https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2014/05/13/a-kingdom-of-two-halves
[https://perma.cc/ELK9-HZ3Q] (archived Nov. 13, 2019) (explaining that, in fact, Jordan
is sometimes described as non-homogenous by comparison to countries like Egypt and
Tunisia as a consequence of the persistent distinctions between the East Bank Bedouins
and the Palestinian refugees that make up the bulk of the population).
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3
multiconfessional political order. 23 The Ottomans ruled for centuries
234
where political order was based on
over a multinational empire,
loyalty to dynastic rule rather than shared ethnic, religious, or tribal
identity. 2 35 Indeed, from the establishment of Islamic rule in the
seventh century under the Umayyads, the Levant, Mesopotamia, and
Arabia maintained an astonishing array of ethnically and religiously
diverse communities governed by a succession of dynasties without a
236
history of sectarian or ethnic secessions.

There have only been three historical examples of efforts to map
territorial boundaries to social identity categories in the region's
2 37
The
modern history. The first was the short-lived Treaty of Sevres.

233. See Reidar Visser, Other People's Maps, 31 WILSON Q. 64, 65 (2007)
(observing, as a historian of Iraq, that "what history shows is that using sects as the
bases for political entities is among the most marginal and least tested approaches to
state building in the land between the Tigris and the Euphrates").
234. The language of "multiculturalism" would be misplaced and anachronistic in
describing an imperial order that dated back to the fifteenth century. Still, the basis for
political order in the empire was no less "multicultural" to borrow Goldberg's
characterization, than corresponding European empires and states of the era. See
Goldberg, After Iraq, supra note 136. Long after nationalist mobilizations produced
wrenching wars in Europe, the Middle East remained characterized by communal
identities and, by the nineteenth century, nationalisms organized around Arab, Kurdish,
Turkish, Armenian and Jewish identities (among others), that were imagined as
potentially compatible with Ottoman citizenship by their adherents. See generally
BEDROSS DER MATOSSIAN, SHATTERED DREAMS OF REVOLUTION: FROM LIBERTY TO

VIOLENCE IN THE LATE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (2014) (discussing the efforts of these
communities to form a multivocal "Ottomanist" constitutionalism in the nineteenth
century to accommodate proto-nationalisms within the frame of imperial citizenship).
There is no need to embrace Ottoman nostalgia (and the suspect latter-day geopolitical
projects it serves) to acknowledge that the empire's communities sustained alternative
political imaginaries to Wilsonian self-determination and the European conception of
nation-states. On the other hand, Der Matossian also shows how these alternative
visions were ultimately repressed in the twentieth century as senior Ottoman officials
themselves embraced a version of Turkish ethno-nationalism that could no longer
accommodate a pluralist conception of citizenship. See id.
235. See Hooshang Amirahmadi, Dark Geopolitics of the Middle East, 18 CAIRO
REV. 86, 88 (2015) (describing the political logic of the Ottoman Empire as a "multiethnic
state based on loyalty to the ruling dynasty, not on a shared national identity."). As an
example, one history of Kurdish notables under the Ottomans notes that while "the
Kurds were actively involved in promoting Kurdish identity and culture, they were still
Ottomanist" in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. See OZO6LU, supra note 231,
at 80-81. Similarly, when the League of Nations sent a fact-finding commission to Mosul
to determine the national preferences of the population, they were frustrated by the noncorrespondence of ethnic identity with political choices. Their effort "to define affiliations
based on a European taxonomy that emphasized ethnicity and nation clashed with
Mosulis' older Ottoman-style affiliations." Sarah Shields, Mosul, the Ottoman Legacy
and the League of Nations, 3 INT'L J. CONTEMP. IRAQI STUD. 217, 217 (2009).
236. See generally VERNON O. EGGER, A HISTORY OF THE MUSLIM WORLD TO 1750:
THE MAKING OF A CIVILIZATION (2017) (providing an overview of dynastic rule in the

Middle East from the Umayyads to the 18th century).
237.

See generally HEATHER LEHR WAGNER, THE DIVISION OF THE MIDDLE EAST:

THE TREATY OF StVRES (2004) (providing a detailed discussion of the division of Ottoman
territories contemplated in the Treaty of Sevres); see also MCDOWALL, supra note 104,
at 131-50.
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second was the French administrative subdivision of Syria. 238 The

third, the division of mandate Palestine by the Partition Plan imposed
by the United Nations, 239 has been sustained through external support
for more than three-quarters of a century. Rather than a source of
stability, that partition has resulted in ongoing regional conflict with
the successful creation of "two states" now an increasingly unlikely

prospect. 240 By contrast to the externally backed partition of Palestine,
the other two attempts at identitarian borders proved unsustainable.
Under the terms of the Sevres Treaty, Kurdistan and Armenia
were to be carved out of Ottoman lands and Anatolia was divided into
European spheres of influence, with Greece establishing protectorates
in Izmir/Smyrna and Edirne/Adrianopolis partly for the benefit of the
Greek Orthodox communities. 2 4 ' The partition contemplated by the
treaty came closer to an ethnic and sectarian partition, in line with
Wilsonian criteria of self-determination, than any of the earlier or
subsequent agreements dividing the post-Ottoman territories. 242 The
treaty was never implemented and was ultimately overridden by the
Turkish war of independence-the aftermath of Sevres serves as an
example of borders being imposed on the European powers rather than
being made by them. Indeed, suspicious of the motivations of European
occupiers, Kurdish forces fought alongside Turkish nationalists despite
Sevres' promise of an autonomous Kurdistan. 243 This may in part have
been a fight of coreligionists against Christian powers, but it was
equally a reflection of a version of Kurdish nationalism still compatible
with imagining a shared political future with Turkish communities in
a post-Ottoman configuration. 24 4 The Turkish leadership ultimately

238. See NEEP, supra note 91, at 30-32.
239. See Richard Wilner, Nationalist Movements and the Middle East Process:
Exercises in Self-Determination, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 297 (1995).
240.

See, e.g., NOURA ERAKAT, JUSTICE FOR SOME: LAW AND THE QUESTION OF

PALESTINE (2019) (providing an overview of the international law dimensions of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the Partition through to the Oslo Peace Process and the
dismantling of the foundations for a two-state solution).
241. See CLEVELAND & BUNTON, supra note 58, at 153-54.
242. See id. at 153.
243. See Othman Ali, The Career of Ozdemir: a Turkish Bid for Northern Iraq,
1921-23, 53 MIDDLE E. STUD. 966, 970-71 (2017) (discussing the relationship between
Turkish and Kurdish military aims in the struggle against the British following the 1920
Sevres treaty and describing how Turkish military leaders exploited resentment of the
British among Kurdish tribes to launch a Kurdish revolt against the British as part of
the broader independence struggle).
244.

See BILL PARK,

TURKEY'S POLICY TOWARD NORTHERN

IRAQ

14 (2005)

(providing an account of the potential motivations of Kurdish chiefs that fought in the
Turkish war of independence); see also FEROZ AHMED, THE MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY

48-49 (1993) (noting that the "[Turkish] nationalists understood the value of Islamic
discourse as a means of providing maximum unity among a mixed population of
Circassians, Lazes, Arabs, Kurds and Turks" in mobilizing them against European
occupation).
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betrayed any hope of such a multiethnic state by imposing a project of
245
Whatever the
ethno-nationalist state building following the war.
motivations, however, the fate of Sevres demonstrates that an early
effort to divide the region along ethnic lines resulted in reversal by
military defeat.
The second failed example of an attempted mapping of identity
onto geography was the French administrative division of Syria
246
(already excluding Lebanon) into four statelets during the mandate.
As discussed above, the French divided Syria between separate
administrations in Damascus and Aleppo and then further subdivided
the country by establishing additional administrative units for the.
Jabal al-Druze region and for an Alawite territory in the mountains
behind Latakia. 24 7 Yet even for their own administrative purposes, the
24 8
Under
French were unable to maintain these designations.
nationalist pressure, the administrations of Damascus and Aleppo
24 9
Then, by the end of the mandate, the
were eventually combined.
Alawite and Druze areas were also incorporated into the larger Syrian
25 0
While the
state under a single administrative structure.
confessional statelets that the French produced for the Alawites and
the Druze were not viable even with French support, decades of
25
segregated rule left a legacy of exacerbated communal divisions. 1
The experiences of Sevres and the Syrian mandate subdivisions
represented foreign efforts to impose borders that would establish
political units with homogenous ethnic or sectarian identities. The
post-Ottoman region proved inhospitable to such ethno-sectarian line
drawing. Far from being artificial, multiethnic, and multiconfessional
societies had characterized Mesopotamia and the Levant for

245. See CLEVELAND & BUNTON, supra note 58, at 166-68.
246. See Fildis, supra note 90, at 134. Nor would it be correct to cite Lebanon itself
as an earlier example of mapping identity onto geography. Rather than producing a state
for

Christians,

under

the

French

mandate

Lebanon

was

managed

as a state

encompassing Sunni, Shi'i and Christian communities and one increasingly marked by
sectarian divisions. See, e.g., Max Weiss, PracticingSectarianism in Mandate Lebanon,
43 J. Soc. HIST. 707, 708-09 (2010) (noting that "over the course of the Mandate period,
the cultural political of difference in Lebanon was refracted through the sectarian
prism.").

247. See NEEP, supra note 91, at 31.
248.

See, e.g., JOHN MCHUGO, SYRIA: A HISTORY OF THE LAST HUNDRED YEARS

(2015) (discussing revolts against subdivisions and rise of Syrian nationalism under the
French mandate); see also Seda Altug, Suriye Arap Milliyetciliginde Vatan ye Suriyelilik
(1919-1939) [Homeland and Syrianness in Syrian Arab Nationalism (1919-1939)], 39
I.U. SIYASAL BILGILER FAKULTESI DERGISI 71 (2008) (Turk.) (discussing the role of the
mandate in shaping Syrian nationalism).
249. See NEEP, supranote 91, at 31-32.
250. See Fildis, supra note 90, at 135.
251. See id.
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centuries. 25 2 By contrast, European-style states with political
boundaries engineered to correspond to ethnonational or religious
identities had no corollaries in the Middle East a century

ago.

Contemporary efforts to discern "natural" lines in the region that form
around ethno-sectarian divisions remain projections of the history of
European state formation on to the complex political and demographic
makeup of the Arab world. 253
More generally, the notion that century-old borders are artificial
because they failed to account for the particular social cleavages that
underlie latter-day conflicts suggests "a supposed transhistorical
dominance of religious and ethnic identities over any other identity"
that is deeply ahistorical. 2 54 There have been many different

-

252. Reidar Visser, the prominent historian of Iraq, has written tirelessly to
dispute accounts of Iraqi politics as necessarily sectarian or driven historically by
confessional conflicts. See, e.g., Reidar Visser, Ethnicity, Federalism and the Idea of
Sectarian Citizenship in Iraq: A Critique, 89 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 809 (2007); Reidar
Visser, HistoricalMyths of a Divided Iraq, 50 SURVIVAL 95 (2008).
253. A striking example of the contemporary repudiation of ethnonational state
formation in the region provides a counterpoint to the new mappings. As we have seen,
the Kurdish communities of the region were divided by existing maps. The enclosure of
the descendants of the Ottoman Kurdish community in the contemporary nation-states
of Iraq, Syria and Turkey is a clear example of how the interwar boundaries excluded an
alternative division of post-Ottoman lands that might have produced an autonomous
Kurdistan. Of all the redrawn lines imagined by latter-day cartographers, only those
related to Kurdistan correspond to clear demands of local communities on the ground.
Yet, over the last decade, Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the longstanding Kurdish
nationalist movement in Turkey, has shifted his position on Kurdish territorial
independence. He has abandoned calls for secession and embraced, instead, a strategy
of increased autonomy and cultural rights within Turkey's modern borders. See Kurdish
Leader Ocalan Seeks End to Turkey Armed Struggle, BRIT. BROAD. CORP. (Feb. 28, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31673830
[https://perma.cc/MS3P-R8V4]
(archived Nov. 15, 2015). In explaining this evolution in his political thinking, Ocalan
reported that he was deeply influenced by reading Benedict Anderson's IMAGINED
COMMUNITIES in prison. See Eyip Can, Ocalan'dan nasil kurtuldum itiraft, RADIKAL
(Feb. 2, 2013) [https://perma.cc/VUC3-28JL] (archived Nov. 15, 2019) (translated by Nick
Danforth in An Imprisoned Nationalist Reads Benedict Anderson, DISSENT (Mar. 7,
2013), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/an-imprisoned-nationalist-reads-benedictanderson [https://perma.cc/J5F4-UEF3] (archived Nov. 15, 2019)). Applying Anderson's
argument to the Kurdish experience, he drew the conclusion "that national structures
can have many different models ... as I understood that the nation-state model was an
iron cage for societies, I realized that freedom and community were more important
concepts." Id. Thus even as the new mappings of the Middle East produced a variety of
proposed Kurdistans in the pages of prominent American publications, the leader of
Turkey's Kurdish community was arguing for the pursuit of devolution rather than a
redrawing of borders. See generally Michael M. Gunter, Prison Writings: the PKK and
the Kurdish Question in the 21st Century, 13 MIDDLE E. POLICY (2011) (book review),
https://www.mepc.org/prison-writings-pkk-and-kurdish-question-21st-century
[https://perma.cc/X4CV-KZ75] (archived Nov. 15, 2019) (discussing Ocalan's political
writings).
254. Toby Dodge, The Danger of Analogical Myths: Explaining the Power and
Consequences of the Sykes-Picot Delusion, 110 AM. J. INT'L L. UNBOUND 132, 135 (2016).
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ideological fault lines across the Middle East in the last century, with
competition between national and pan-Arab loyalties and later panIslamic commitments characterizing the first half century after
25 5
Today there is no doubt that
independence for many Arab countries.
real grievances in Iraq or Syria have been channeled into ethnic or
religious conflict. Yet to suppose that these identities have always been
the primary sources of meaning and affiliation for the communities of
the Middle East is to adopt a static and primordial view of a complex

region.25 6
C. Drawing "BetterBorders"
All of the new mapping projects for the region begin from the
premise that "better," or at least more stable, borders can be discerned
in the ruins of collapsing Arab states like Iraq and Syria. Most of the
authors identify ethnicity and sect as the guiding principle for their
new boundaries. All three of the maps canvassed in the third Part of
this Article propose new boundaries that map political geography onto
demography. In the case of Iraq, every new mapping disaggregates the
country into three separate subunits for Kurds, Sunni Arabs, and
Shiite Arabs. Similarly, in Syria, a Sunni-majority territory is carved
out of the country as well as an autonomous region for Kurds, with the
remaining collection of minorities (Alawites, Druze, Armenians) and
urban elites accorded a rump territory in the southwestern parts of the
country. In drawing these new territorial boundaries, the authors
emphasize the ways in which such borders would reorder underlying

societies along the lines of their social divisions, effectively separating
communities as a conflict resolution strategy.
What is rarely acknowledged is that, despite years of conflict in
both Iraq and Syria, the millennia old plurality in both countries
257
Dividing this plurality
persists in urban centers and their provinces.
ratifying current
require
would
units
component
into homogenous

255. See generally MALCOLM KERR, THE ARAB COLD WAR: GAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR
AND HIS RIVALS, 1958-1970 (1971) (discussing ideological divisions defining the first
decades of the post-colonial Middle East).
256. See Reidar Visser, The Western Imposition of Sectarianismon Iraqi Politics,
15/16 ARAB STUD. J. 83, 95 (2008).
257. Iraqi politician Ayad Allawi remarked in an interview for the Wall Street
Journal on the resilient nationalism and commitment to a united, if federated, Iraq
despite the violence and privations that have characterized the country for the quarter
century since the 1991 Gulf war. See Yaroslav Trofimov, Would New Borders Mean Less
Conflict
in
the
Middle
East?,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Apr.
10,
2015),
https://www.wsj .com/articles/would-new-borders-mean-less-conflict-in-the-middle-east1428680793 [https://perma.cc/R2VB-KB2X] (archived Nov. 15, 2019) ("Indeed, even in
battered and tattered Iraq and Syria, nationalist feelings remain very much alive. 'If any
country passed through what Iraq passed through in the last 12 years, it would have
been dismembered by now.' Said Ayad Allawi, Iraq's vice president and a former prime
minister. 'What kept the country alive was the will of the people."').
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paroxysms of ethnic cleansing in some parts of these countries while
inviting extensive additional displacement and communal violence to

complete
implicit 2

an ethno-sectarian
8

territorial division

elsewhere.

The

cleansing logic of these new mappings may explain why the

boundaries traced by Western experts on the maps of the region bear
a striking resemblance to ISIS' vision of a homogenous Sunnistan.
Among Arab Sunnis other than ISIS, however, there is no local

constituency for new, exclusively Sunni boundaries. 259 Like the SykesPicot borders, these are quintessentially Western projections. In the
case of the new mappings, the guiding principle is not imperial
territorial acquisition, but the application of the European logic of
nation-state homogenization onto the ethnic and religious multiplicity
of the Arab world.

Clearly, ethnic cleansing-based social engineering projects are
inconsistent with an international order that embraces basic norms of
human rights. The fact that new borders would require further

displacement of the peoples of the region is not a point on which the
new cartographers dwell. Instead, new borders are presented as the
natural extension of developments already underway. The fact that
depictions of a more peaceful and stable future with new borders offer
an implicit argument to Western policymakers in favor of processes of
cleansing goes unacknowledged. 26 0 Indeed, advocates of new borders-

258. In fact, Ralph Peters is alone among the new cartographers in explicitly
acknowledging that his imagined map could only be accomplished through ethnic.
cleansing. Addressing the matter succinctly, Peters remarks: "Ethnic cleansing works."
Peters, supra note 26.
259. See Ben Connable, PartitioningIraq: Make a Detailed Case or Cease and
Desist, WAR ON THE RocKS (May 2016), https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/partitioningiraq-make-a-detailed-case-or-cease-and-desist/
[https://perma.cc/9QZM-2XXW]
(archived Nov. 15, 2019) (stating that "Sunnis do not want to secede and do not wish to
form their own state separate from Baghdad. Based on my conversations with Sunni
leaders from December 2013 through mid-June 2015, analysis of Arabic-language Sunni
speeches and writings, and a comparative analysis of two months of recent social media
posts from the Sunni Anbar province there is almost no evidence of secessionist
language"); see also Munqith al-Dagher & Karl Kaltenthaler, A striking positive shift in
Sunni opinion in Iraq is underway. Here's what it means, WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/09/14/iraqi-sunnis-areimpressed-by-the-defeat-of-isis-heres-what-that-could-mean/?utm term=.56ae024ff7 If
[https://perma.cc/KN54-9L92] (archived Nov. 15, 2019); Scott Peterson, How Sunnis'
post-ISIS crisis is leading some to a new Iraqi nationalism, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
(Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2017/1227/How-Sunnispost-ISIS-crisis-is-leading-some-to-a-new-Iraqi-nationalism
[https://perma.cc/5G28U9BE] (archived Nov. 15, 2019).
260. For a discussion of partition as the product of the imperial imagination of the
first half of the twentieth century that depends on the privileging of ethnic nationalism
but obscures this by presenting partition as a "natural" solution to the problem of
pluralism, see ARIE M. DUBNOV & LAURA ROBSON, PARTITIONS: A TRANSNATIONAL
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clearly believe that self-determination for the ethnic and sectarian
communities of the region would both reduce conflict and improve
26
rights protections. 1 Even setting aside the troubling question of the
human rights consequences of the violence that would be required to
produce these new nations, why should we expect such homogenized
states, once established, to perform "better" by virtue of their new
borders? States with pronounced ethno-sectarian majorities are
unlikely to improve the region's record in minority rights protections.
Moreover, small states devised to coincide with ethno-sectarian
identity would likely invite intervention from larger neighbors,
whether in the form of Turkish pressure on Kurdistan or Iranian
262
influence over the widely envisioned Arab Shia state.
The recent record of newly partitioned states provides little reason
to expect improved governance. If social divisions-whether tribal,
ethnic, or religious-were to correspond to spatial divisions drawn on
a map, the effect would be to entrench the equation of identity with
geography, leaving questions of governance open. As one regional
analyst has noted, "[y]ou could split these countries into two or three
or four and you'd have the same practice of power in each of those units.
.. The problem is the divisive and autocratic and corrupt way power is
263
The focus on remappings of the region
practiced, not the borders."
governance crisis.
underlying
this
from
attention
diverts
that alternative borders
suggest
region
the
in
events
Recent

resulting from the partition of existing states are no better and often

HISTORY OF TwENTIETH-CENTURY TERRITORIAL SEPARATISM 27 (Stanford Univ. Press

2019) (surveying the history of partitions in Ireland, India/Pakistan, and
Israel/Palestine).
261. For example, Jeffrey Goldberg describes his conception of a new map as being
designed, among other things, to "help right some historic wrongs" suffered by the
Kurdish people by addressing their status as "perennially oppressed." Viewing their
presence within Iraq as "one source of instability," new borders in Iraq are conceived by
Goldberg as both a conflict-resolution and rights-enhancing mechanism. Goldberg, After
Iraq, supra note 136.
262. See Nick Danforth, Stop Blaming Colonial Borders for the Middle East's
2013),
11,
(Sept.
ATLANTIC
Problems,
9
3
2
stop-blaming-colonialhttps://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/ 01 /0 /
borders-for-the-middle-easts-problems/279561/ [https://perma.cc/2H72-B64V] (archived
Nov. 15, 2019) (noting that a "predominantly Kurdish state built around the old Ottoman
province of Mosul would almost inevitably have become ensnared in the ongoing conflict
between the Republic of Turkey and its own Kurdish minority" and that "Shiite Iran
would have had religious grounds to try to incorporate a small Shiite state based around
Basra").
263. Robert F. Worth, Redrawn Lines Seen as No Cure in Iraq Conflict, N.Y. TIMES
(June 26, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/world/middleeast/redrawn-linesseen-as-no-cure-in-iraq-conflict.html [https://perma.cc/AU4H-XUR5] (archived Nov. 15,
2019) (quoting a statement by Peter Harling, senior Middle East and North Africa
adviser for the International Crisis Group).
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considerably worse for peace and regional stability. 264 Indeed, there

are no positive examples of cases in which a heterogeneous state has
been successfully partitioned along ethnic or sectarian lines to produce

politically stable and economically viable new states able to survive
without massive external security support. Kosovo continues to depend
on external support even as it has devolved into a corrupt and often
repressive state.2 65 The fragmentation of Syria became a wellspring for
myriad new conflicts.2 66 In Sudan, the division of the country in two
did little to quell violence2 6 7 or improve governance.2 6 8 One analysis
suggests that where state partition has been applied as a "solution" to
intractable conflicts, the strategy has "generated enduring interstate
rivalries, chronic state fragility and reproduced the same ethnic
inequalities that led to partitioning in the first place. 2 6 9 Another study

draws a similar conclusion in contemplating the likely consequences of
ethno-sectarian division in Iraq. 2 70 In Libya, the bifurcation of the
state into two separate governments (and the trifurcation of the
territory into three functionally autonomous regions) has led to the
deaths of thousands of civilians and the displacement of hundreds of

264. The violent legacies of the earlier partitions of the post-colonial state
formation era, notably the partition of India and Pakistan, also speak eloquently to the
limited potential of partition as a means of conflict-resolution. See generally YASMIN
KHAN, THE GREAT PARTITION: THE MAKING OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN (2017).

265. ANDREA LORENZO CAPUSSELA, STATE-BUILDING IN Kosovo: DEMOcRAcY,
CORRUPTION AND THE EU IN THE BALKANS (2015).

266. For an assessment of the ongoing fragmentation of Syria even as the regime
consolidated its position beginning in 2017, see Alexander Bick, Syria is Sliding Towards
Partition, WAR ON THE ROcKS (Nov. 2, 2017), https:/warontherocks.com/2017/11/syriais-sliding-towards-partition/ [https://perma.cc/62DF-BKNL] (archived Mar. 14, 2020).
267. See 'Senselesscycle of violence' in South Sudan must end-UN humanitarian
chief,
UNITED
NATIONS
NEWS
CTR.
(July
25,
2015),
https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/
senseless-cycle-violence-south-sudan-mustend-%E2%80%93-un-humanitarian-chief [https://perma.cc/AJ5W-D8BV] (archived Nov.
15, 2019) (noting the existence of a "rapidly spiraling humanitarian crisis" resulting from
"ongoing violence and deprivation" on the fourth anniversary of South Sudan's
independence).
268. See Mario Silva, After Partition:The Perils of South Sudan, 3 U. BALT. L.J.
63, 68 (2015).
269. Goitom Gebreluel & Kjetil Tronvoll, South Sudan's Post-Secession Crisis in
Comparative Perspective, YALE JOURNAL OF INT'L AFFAIRS (Mar. 12, 2014),
http://yalejournal.org/article post/south-sudans-post-secession-crisis-in-a-comparativeperspective/ [https://perma.cc/KG4V-SM2H] (archived Nov. 15, 2019) (surveying the
post-partition trajectories of South Sudan, Eritrea, and Somaliland).
270. See Paul R. Williams & Matthew T. Simpson, Rethinking the PoliticalFuture:
An Alternative to the Ethno-SectarianDivision of Iraq, 24 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 191, 21415 (2008); see also Mark Perry, Why PartitionsDon't Work, POLITICO (Feb. 2, 2015),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/02/partitions-dont-work-114529
[https://perma.cc/7J6S-REPC] (archived Nov. 15, 2019).
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thousands. 27 1 Violence, political polarization, and the rise of jihadi
extremism have attended the division of the country, prompting
international efforts to piece it back together through a UN-brokered
unity government, which is imperiled by renewed conflict between the
2 72
country's regions.
Far from tamping down communal violence, recent examples of
partition in the region suggest that such new borders foment violence
and exacerbate the underlying conflicts they were meant to address.
There is every reason to expect that smaller statelets elsewhere in the
region would fare no better, facing, at a minimum, challenges in
defending their external borders and securing sources of political and
economic viability internally. Despite the widespread consensus that
Kurdistan should be on the short list of new borders in the region, an
autonomous Kurdish state enjoys little international support at
present precisely because it would require extensive external
assistance to withstand the pressures that would undoubtedly be
exerted against it by hostile neighbors. While an independent
273
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from external attack. On the other hand, arrangements of
decentralization rather than full territorial independence have enabled
the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq to be remarkably
successful at protecting its population, even from the ravages of
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6HU4] (archived Nov. 15, 2019) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH] (discussing the
ravages of the division of Libya and the displacement of civilians); see also WHO: More
than 1,000 killed in battle for Libya's Tripoli, AL JAZEERA (July 9, 2019),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/1000-killed-battle-libya-tripoli190708191029535.html [https://perma.cc/XRW3-HV4C] (archived Nov. 15, 2019)
(discussing the civilian casualties in Libya's civil war in 2019).
272. See, e.g., Hafed al-Ghwell & Karim Mezran, A way forward in Libya, THE
HILL (June 1, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/international/446455-a-way-forward-inlibya_[https://perma.cc/Q4E3-UJ8N] (archived Nov. 15, 2019); Ian Black, Libya's descent
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16,
(Feb.
GUARDIAN
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libyas-armed-politics-the-guardianhttps://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/16/
briefing [https://perma.cc/8N3T-GNQK] (archived Nov. 15, 2019); Kareem Fahim
Suliman Ali Zway, Libya's Rival Factions Sign Deal for Unity Government, N.Y. TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/18/world/africa/libya-unity2015),
17,
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government.html [https://perma.cc/G842-JLR8] (archived Nov. 15, 2019); Libya has
Council,
'lurched from one emergency to another,' high-level UN official tells Security
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UNITED NATIONS NEWS (Sept. 5, 2018), https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/0 /1018511
[https://perma.cc/Y586-6AWU] (archived Nov. 15, 2019).
273. See Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (1993),
[https://perma.cc/82HXhttps://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraganfal/ANFALINT.htm
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ISIS.274 Indeed, avoiding the bloodshed that might attend new borders
has been one of the principal reasons that Kurdish communities across
Iraq, Turkey, and Syria have undertaken political experiments in
decentralization and devolution from within existing borders. In this

sense, the logic of uti possidetis remains pertinent to the region.
In the end, the "artificial states" thesis that connects Sykes-Picot
to the new mappings of the region is flawed because it exaggerates the
arbitrariness of existing borders while radically understating the costs
that would be attendant to any attempt to change the boundaries. By
insisting that the alleged noncorrespondence between the political
geography of the region and its ethno-sectarian divisions is the source

of Arab state fragility, these arguments also divert attention from the
role played by external intervention in precipitating the collapse of
states in Iraq and Libya. 275 In so doing, arguments in favor of new
borders run the risk of inviting further interventions to "correct" for
colonial borders.

Jackson's "quasi-states" concept offers little insight into the
destabilization of Arab states when wedded to arguments about the
historical or demographic artificiality of their borders. On the other

hand, the quasi-state thesis might be read to stand for a different set
of propositions. If the argument, instead, were that decolonization
produced relations of dependency between the appointed governing
elites of the newly sovereign states of the region and external patrons,
then an alternative explanation for destabilization in the Arab world
would emerge grounded in geopolitics rather than geography. Here
attention would turn to internal crises of governance and state
(klepto-) capitalism rather than identity. Such an inquiry might also
examine the role of external interventions in reordering regional

security increasingly along sectarian lines. But such an alternative
explanation would require solutions based not in new borders but in
new forms of governance less beholden to repression and the support

of external patrons.

274. See Kosar Nawzad, Kurdish security chief, US diplomat discuss anti-ISIS
campaign, KURDISTAN 24 (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/
51cac659-4810-43d7-a901-160852304674 [https://perma.cc/C85M-BXKK] (archived Nov.
15, 2019).
275. See Alan J. Kuperman, Obama's Libya Debacle, FOREIGN AFF. (Mar.-Apr.
2015),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2019-02-18/obamas-libya-debacle
[https://perma.cc/6M5K-G9AG] (archived Nov. 15, 2019) (discussing the role of external
intervention in the collapse of Libya). There is an extensive literature by respected
political scientists, journalists, diplomats and historians on the role of the U.S. invasion
of Iraq in precipitating that state's collapse. See, e.g., PATRICK COCKBURN, THE
OCCUPATION: WAR AND RESISTANCE IN IRAQ (2007); RICK FAWN & RAYMOND
HINNEBUSCH, THE IRAQ WAR: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (2006); PETER W. GALBRAITH,
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: How WAR IN IRAQ STRENGTHENED AMERICA'S ENEMIES

(2009); Toby Dodge, The Causes of US Failurein Iraq, 49 SURVIVAL 85 (2007).
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V. CONCLUSION

One of the greatest drawbacks of the "artificial" state thesis may
be that it states a truism. All borders are necessarily arbitrary in that
political lines drawn on a map rarely coincide with an organic
topography. Social identities do not produce natural boundaries that
shift with changing demography. Nor are identities stable categories
that congeal over time into discernible lines to be analyzed by
disinterested expert cartographers. National consciousness and
mobilization may arise around shared ties of ethnicity or sect, or
equally be informed by shared historical experience or cultural legacies
or linguistic heritage or political ideology or other contingent factors.
In Europe, centuries of war produced processes of state formation that
converged around dominant ethnonational identities. Transposing this
version of the European nation-state model to the diversity of cultures
and identities in the Middle East is a recipe for violence rather than a
more stable regional ordering.
Sykes-Picot remains a source of resentment in the region not
because of the particular borders it contemplated but because it was a
pact that divided Ottoman lands without regard for-and often in
direct tension with-the preferences of the indigenous population and
its leaders. Moreover, Sykes-Picot represented the presumption of
continued (indirect) imperial rule. Here the problem was the
governance arrangement made explicit by the Sykes-Picot map, with
external powers, sometimes in conjunction with chosen local
interlocutors, deciding not only on the territories awarded to different
276
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The new borders drawn on the maps by Peters, Goldberg, and
Wright have proven more likely to provoke outrage than earn support
among the populations now residing in the affected territories. Yet

276. Despite claims that the League of Nations mandate system was designed to
offer a form of tutelage that would enable territories to eventually become self-governing,
in fact the British used their mandate to impose their preferred form of governmentmonarchy-on as many of the post-Ottoman territories as possible. See James Dawson,
Why Britain created monarchies in the Middle East, NEW STATESMAN (Aug. 15, 2014),
https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2014/08/why-britain-created-monarchiesmiddle-east [https://perma.cc/7RZ4-YYH8] (archived Nov. 15, 2019) (providing an
approving discussion of the British rationale); see also MICHAEL PROVENCE, THE LAST
OTTOMAN GENERATION AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST 25 (Cambridge

Univ. Press 2017).
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unlike Sykes-Picot, these latter-day cartographers are not proposing a
strictly self-interested territorial division but instead seek to discern
borders that correspond to the identities of the underlying population.

The lines they choose are extrapolated from the fact of sectarian,
ethnic, and tribal conflict in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and beyond. This

reading of regional conflicts as essentially identitarian misses the
broader context in which they are occurring and thus offers the wrong

prescription for conflict resolution.
Viewing these conflicts in terms of sectarianism or the imminent

collapse of borders confuses cause and effect. The drivers of these
conflicts do have important ties to the context of Sykes-Picot. Imperial
intervention a century ago and ongoing external interventions in the
region in the decades since have bequeathed a legacy of brittle states

led by kleptocratic elites. What is at issue is not the artificiality of the
borders but the quality of institutions that make up the states of a
region whose energy resources remain a source of geostrategic
competition, with great power patrons cultivating and supporting local
clients from the Gulf to North Africa. Authoritarian rulers capable of
astonishing paroxysms of violence against their own citizens-as with
the Hama massacre in Syria and the Anfal campaign in Iraq 27 7-long
enjoyed unconditional external support. The last decade of instability
has witnessed a further crisis of authoritarian governance as shifts in
the political economy of the region have compromised the longstanding pact between rulers and their publics. 2 78 That pact depended
on provision of public services-including health, education, and social
welfare-and the promise of improving standards of living for growing
populations despite the lack of meaningful civil and political rights. 279
As analysts of the Arab uprisings have shown, predatory privatization
across the region in the 1980s and 1990s produced astronomical income
inequality while structural adjustment ended guarantees of full
employment through the public sector, and a population explosion
produced a bulge of undereducated and unemployed youth. 280 Where
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BROTHERHOOD IN SYRIA (2013) (discussing the Hama massacre).
278. See Marwan Muasher, The Next Arab Uprising, FOREIGN AFF. (Nov.-Dec.
2018),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-10-15/next-arabuprising [https://perma.cc/4796-LCA9] (archived Nov. 15, 2019) (discussing the collapse
of the long-standing "social contracts binding Middle East governments and their
citizens").
279.

See generally MARWAN MUASHER, THE SECOND ARAB AWAKENING AND THE

BATTLE FOR PLURALISM (2014) (discussing the unraveling of this prior socio-political pact
between governments and citizens in the Arab world and what might succeed it).
280. See, e.g., MELANI CAMMETT & ISHAC DIWAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
ARAB UPRISINGS (2013); Yezid Sayigh, The Crisis of the Arab Nation-State, CARNEGIE
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these conditions intersect with privileged access to state resources or
social welfare based on communal identities, broader social justicebased uprisings in the region have been channeled into ethnic or

sectarian strife.
There is no question that the governments of existing states in the

region bear the lion's share of responsibility for the ethno-sectarian
conflicts that have emerged out of these conditions. In this context, it
is politically and ethically problematic to demand of minority
communities within these territories that they forego aspirations for
independence in the name of maintaining regional peace while their

governments continue to deny them cultural, political, and economic
rights. The responsibility for resurrecting older antecedents of
transethnic, trans-sectarian solidarities in the region cannot lie with

minority populations that have been subjected to internal colonialism
and marginalization within century-old borders. Instead, the onus for

reforms that afford greater autonomy to the region's diverse
populations must be on those whose rule by coercion has produced the
current impasse. Whether it is possible to resurrect earlier conceptions
of political community distinct from ethno-sectarian identity or forge

new ones after a century of Turkish and Arab nationalisms is, of
course, highly contested. Exploring this question requires meaningful
engagement with the lived experiences of communities in the region
and their nascent experiments with alternative models of authority. In
short, such an inquiry would be far more demanding-and

constructive-than abstract exercises in map making from thousands
of miles away.
The problem in the Arab world is neither sectarianism nor the
purported collapse of borders but governments whose rule within
existing borders is centralized, authoritarian, corrupt, incompetent,
discriminatory, brutal, and often dependent on external patrons.

Solutions to what is a profound crisis of political legitimacy require the
formation, bottom-up, of a new social compact. No single formula or
line drawn on a map can offer a panacea that will resolve this crisis
across the region. But a better starting point than new borders or
ethno-sectarian mappings would look to strategies of decentralization
28
and devolution, political liberalization, and economic redistribution. 1
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